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NAKED PREFERENCES AND THE CONSTITUTION
Cass R. Sunstein *
INTRODUCTION

One of the most striking facts of modern constitutional law is the overlap-almost the identity-of current tests under many of the most important clauses of the Constitution: the dormant commerce, privileges and
immunities,' equal protection, due process, contract, and eminent domain
clauses. 2 Although these clauses have different historical roots and were
originally directed at different problems, they are united by a common
theme and focused on a single underlying evil: the distribution of resources
or opportunities to one group rather than another solely on the ground that
those favored have exercised the raw political power to obtain what they
want. I will call this underlying evil a naked preference.
The prohibition of naked preferences captures large areas of doctrine
under all six clauses. The privileges and immunities clause, for example,
prohibits a state from preferring its citizens over outsiders unless "there are
perfectly valid independent reasons for" the preference. 3 The dormant
commerce clause allows discrimination against interstate commerce, with
its attendant costs to out-of-staters, only if the discrimination is a means of
promoting some goal unrelated to protectionism. 4 The equal protection
clause allows a state to distinguish between one person and another only if
there is a plausible connection between the distinction and a legitimate
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago. A.B. 1975, J.D. 1978, Harvard
University. The author would like to thank Bruce A. Ackerman, Douglas G. Baird, Walter J.
Blum, David P. Currie, Frank H. Easterbrook, Richard A. Epstein, Daniel R. Fischel, Diane
Wood Hutchinson, Edward H. Levi, Geoffrey P. Miller, Michael J. Perry, Richard A. Posner,
Carol M. Rose, Frederick Schauer, Steven H. Shiffrin, Geoffrey R. Stone, David A. Strauss,
Mark V. Tushnet, James Boyd White, Lawrence Wieman, and Hans Zeisel for helpful comments on a previous draft. Participants in the Legal Theory Workshop at the Columbia Law
School furnished valuable assistance. Richard Herding provided able research assistance and
useful suggestions, and the Law and Economics Program of the University of Chicago provided financial support.
1. The reference throughout is to the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, not
of the fourteenth amendment. After the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873), the latter
provision became a "practical nullity." E. Corwin, The Constitution of the United States of
America 1306 (1972).
2. Freedom of religion or speech will not be discussed here, though both may be understood as embodying similar principles. See generally P. Kurland, Religion and the Law
(1962) (discussing neutrality principle of religion clauses); Stone, Content Regulation and the
First Amendment, 25 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 189 (1983) (exploring reasons for special distrust
of content-based classifications under free speech clause).
3. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948).
4. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
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public purpose.5 The contract clause does not forbid an impairment of contractual obligations if the impairment is the "incidental" consequence of "a
generally applicable rule of conduct" designed to promote legitimate government goals. s The eminent domain clause embodies similar principles,
both in the requirement that a "public use" must be shown to justify a
taking of private property and in the distinction that has been developed
7
between permissible exercises of the police power and prohibited takings.
Because of their common concern with naked preferences, these clauses
share a number of features. They are all directed in large part at discrimination 8 based on an impermissible purpose. 9 Effects are relevant, if at all,
only to show such a purpose. A number of devices-most prominently, the
required showing of some degree of means-ends connection and the identification of a category of impermissible government ends-are applied under
all of these clauses to filter out naked preferences.
The prohibition of naked preferences captures a significant theme in
the original intent. It is closely related to the central constitutional concern
of ensuring against capture of government power by faction. 10 The framers' hostility toward naked preferences was rooted in the fear that government power would be usurped solely to distribute wealth or opportunities
to one group or person at the expense of another. The constitutional requirement that something other than a naked preference be shown to justify differential treatment provides a means, admittedly imperfect, 1 of
ensuring that government action results from a legitimate effort to promote
the public good rather than from a factional takeover. The Court's adherence to this requirement under the various clauses and over long historical
periods showing otherwise considerable doctrinal change reflects a striking
continuity in general approach.
The prohibition of naked preferences also reflects the Constitution's

5. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
6. Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 103 S.Ct. 2296, 2306 (1983).
7. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984); Miller v. Schoene, 276
U.S. 272 (1928).
8. I use the term "discrimination" throughout this Article to refer to treating one group
or individual differently from another. The term need not connote hostility.
9. The Court has assumed, under all of the clauses, that it is possible to discover or
construct a legislative or executive "purpose" that can be used as the basis for analysis, That
assumption will not be questioned here, and there will thus be no discussion of the problem of
ascertaining the purpose of a collective decisionmaking body. For such discussions, see Ely,
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale LJ. 1205 (1970);
Moore, The Semantics ofJudging, 54 S. Cal. L. Rev. 151 (1981); Note, Reading the Mind of
the School Board: Segregative Intent and the De Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86 Yale LJ. 317

(1976).
10. The Federalist Nos. 10, 51 (J. Madison) are the classic statements. See, e.g., D. Epstein, The Political Theory of The Federalist 5-7, 94-110 (1984); G. Wills, Explaining
America: The Federalist (1981).
11. The extent of the constraint depends on the vigor with which courts enforce it. See
infra text accompanying notes 43-66.
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roots in civil republicanism and accompanying conceptions of civic virtue. 1 2
The notion that government actions must be responsive to something other
than private pressure is associated with the idea that politics is "not the
reconciling but the transcending of the different interests of the society in
the search for the single common good." 1 3 Civil republicanism embodies a
conception of politics in which preferences are not viewed as private and
exogenous. Their selection is the object of the governmental process. 14 The
model for this conception of government is the town meeting, where decisions are made during a process of collective self-determination.' 5
In accordance with the original Madisonian understanding,' 6 the prohibition is focused on the motivations of legislators, not of their constituents.
The prohibition therefore embodies a particular conception of representation. Under that conception, the task of legislators is not to respond to private pressure but instead to select values through deliberation and debate.17
Finally, the prohibition of naked preferences is reflected in the structural provisions of the Constitution. Indeed, the framers believed that those
provisions would provide the most important means of implementing the
prohibition. The separation of powers, both in general and in its concrete
constitutional manifestations, was designed to limit the power of self-interested groups or factions by ensuring that government power would be exercised in accordance with certain predetermined constraints. It is no
coincidence that the most celebrated case employing the nondelegation
doctrine involved a delegation of legislative authority to private groups.' 8
Similarly, the general welfare provision of the spending clause was designed
12. See D. Epstein, supra note 10, at 5-7, 94-110. This is not to deny, however, that
traces of a pluralistic and interest-group oriented political conception can also be found in the
Constitution's background. See, e.g., The Federalist Nos. 10, 51 (J. Madison). There has
been considerable debate in recent years over the extent of such traces. See, e.g., J. Pocock,
The Machiavellian Moment (1975); H. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For (1981);
The Moral Foundations of the American Republic (R. Horwitz ed. 1979); G. Wills, supra
note 10; G. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (1972).
13. G. Wood, supra note 12, at 58. See generally H. Arendt, On Revolution 127-37
(1977) (describing role of conceptions of civic virtue, or "public happiness," in American
revolutionary thought); J. Mansbridge, Beyond Adversary Democracy (1980) (contrasting
"adversary" and "unitary" conceptions of democracy); W. Sullivan, Reconstructing Public
Philosophy (1982) (arguing in favor of recovering republican heritage).
14. Of course, such an express preference-creating role for government raises the spectre
of tyranny, see Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-commodity Values,
92 Yale L.J. 1537 (1983), as the framers were well aware. See The Federalist No. 10 (J.
Madison).
15. This model is a dominant presence in first amendment law. See A. Meiklejohn, Free
Speech and its Relation to Self-Government (1948).
16. See The Federalist No. 10 (J. Madison); Wood, Democracy and the Constitution, in
How Democratic is the Constitution 11-12 (R. Goldwin & W. Schambra eds. 1980).
17. See H. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 168-89 (1967) (discussing Burkean
understanding of representation); Morgan, Madison's Theory of Representation in the Tenth
Federalist, 36 J. Politics 852 (1974).
18. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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to ensure that public resources would be devoted to broad social interests. 19
Nor is it surprising that the Court's legislative veto decision-perhaps the
most important separation of powers decision in recent years-focused on
the factional dangers produced by evasion of the presentment and bicameralism requirements of article 1.20
Quite apart from its roots in original intent, the prohibition of naked
preferences captures the judicial understanding that the Constitution requires all government action to be justified by reference to some public
value. The "reasonableness" constraint of the due process clause is perhaps
the most obvious example. The minimum requirement that government
decisions be something other than a raw exercise of political power has been
embodied in constitutional doctrine under the due process clause before,
during, and after the Lochner era.2 1 The equal protection clause, in its core
requirement that classifications be justified by reference to some public
value, reflects an identical understanding. 22 The same principle has been
embodied in constitutional doctrine under many other clauses as well. The
contract and eminent domain clauses, for example, are efforts to apply the
general prohibition of naked preferences to several specific instances of gov23
ernment action about which the framers were most concerned.
The notion that government action must be grounded in something
other than an exercise of raw political power is in considerable tension with
many of the most prominent theories of how government does and should
operate. 24 It is especially at odds with pluralism. Naked preferences are
common fare in the pluralist conception; interest-group politics invites
them. 25 The prohibition of naked preferences, enforced as it is by the
courts, stands as a repudiation of theories positing that the judicial role is
only to police the processes of representation to ensure that all affected in19. See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 586-87 (1937). The breadth of the
general welfare provision is a response to changes similar to those that expanded the permissible ends of government under the due process, contract, and eminent domain clauses. See
text accompanying note 186.
20. INS v. Chadha, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2782-84 (1983).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 133-41.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 114-17.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 142-44, 167-74.
24. See, e.g., A. Bentley, The Process of Government (1908); R. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (1956); D. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public
Opinion (1962); cf. R. Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control (1982)
(amending pluralist conception). On the economic side, see, e.g., Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. Econ. 371 (1983); Peltzman,
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & Econ. 211 (1976); Stigler, The
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971). But see Kalt &
Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 279
(1984) (criticizing interest-group theory of legislation). For a brief restatement and critique of
pluralism, see J. Habermas, Legitimation Crisis 122-24 (1975); see also T. Spragens, The
Irony of Liberal Reason 301-10 (1981) (positive and normative attack),
25. See R. Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control 31-54
(1982); Posner, The Defunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 27-28.
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terest-groups may participate. 26 It presupposes that courts will serve as critics of the pluralist vision, not as adherents striving only to "clear the
channels" in preparation for the ensuing political struggle. In this respect,
the prohibition of naked preferences reflects a distinctly substantive value
and cannot easily be captured in procedural terms. Moreover, it reflects an
attractive conception of politics, one that does not understand the political
process as simply another sort of market. 27 It is hardly surprising that the
prohibition is reflected in many areas of constitutional law.
This Article will argue that the prohibition of naked preferences captures large areas of current constitutional doctrine and is therefore the best
candidate for a unitary conception of the sorts of government action that
the Constitution prohibits. 28 But courts have interpreted the prohibition in
different ways over time and among clauses, and these differences are of
independent interest. In tracing the evolution of the prohibition, the focus
of this Article will be primarily descriptive. In addition, however, it will
suggest that the prohibition embodies an understanding of governance that
has considerable appeal, and that, if taken seriously, could form the basis
for a distinctive conception of politics and a distinctive judicial role.
I.

NAKED PREFERENCES AND PUBLIC VALUES: THE FRAMEWORK

It will be useful to begin by distinguishing between two bases for treating one person or group differently from another. The first is a naked preference. When a naked preference is at work, one group or person is treated
differently from another solely because of a raw exercise of political power;
no broader or more general justification exists. For example, state A may
treat its own citizens better than those of state B-say, by requiring people
from state B to pay for the use of the local parks-simply because its own
citizens have the political power and want better treatment. Or a city may
treat blacks worse than whites--say, by denying them welfare benefitsbecause whites have the power to restrict state largesse to themselves. Or a
state may relieve a group of citizens from a contractual obligation, thus
26. See J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980).
27. Conceptions of civic virtue, in one form or another, have been the centerpiece of the
frequent recent attacks on pluralism in political and constitutional theory. See, e.g., J.
Habermas, supra note 24; A. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (1981); R.
Unger, Knowledge and Politics (1975); R. Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism (1968). For a
discussion of the relationship of the radical critique of pluralism to republican conceptions of
civic virtue, see Whelan, Marx and Revolutionary Virtue, in Marxism: Nomos XXVI 67-71
J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1983). Whether such conceptions can be sustained in an
industrialized nation controlled largely by well-organized groups with competing interests is
an important and difficult question. No attempt will be made to resolve it here.
28. Any unitary conception, of course, risks oversimplification of a complicated reality.
It would hardly be surprising to find that the Constitution, written by many different people,
interpreted by many more, and assembled over a period of centuries, prohibits more than a
single evil. Cf. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802 (1982)
(discussing impossibility, under certain conditions, of achieving consistency through decisions
by collective bodies).
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benefiting them at the expense of another group of contracting parties, simply because the first group and its allies seized the political power to dispossess the second group of the rights that it previously had.
These examples illustrate a conception of the political process as a
mechanism by which self-interested individuals or groups seek to obtain
wealth or opportunities at the expense of others. Political ordering is assimilated to market ordering. The public interest is understood as the aggregation of private interests. The task of the legislator is to respond to the
pressures imposed by those interests. This conception of the political process reflects a set of values within which any other conception appears mystical, potentially totalitarian, or both.
Contrast with this a conception of a political process in which differential treatment is justified not by reference to raw political power, but to
some public value that the differential treatment can be said to serve. A
public value can be defined as any justification for government action that
goes beyond the exercise of raw political power. 29 For example, a state may
impose regulatory requirements on opticians, but not on optometrists, because the methods used by the former group create special risks of deception
or overreaching. Or a state may relieve a group of people from a contractual obligation because the contract called for an act-say, the passing on
of increased costs to consumers-that violated a public policy demanding
that consumers be insulated from some of the dislocations caused by an
unregulated marketplace. Or state A may treat its own citizens better than
those of state B-say, by limiting welfare payments to its own citizensbecause it wants to restrict social spending to those who in the past have
made, or in the future might make, a contribution to state revenues. 30
These examples reflect a conception of the political process as an effort
to select and implement public values. The process is primarily one of collective self-determination, rather than of compromises or trade-offs among
preexisting private interests. 3 1 The role of the representative is to deliberate
rather than to respond mechanically to constituent pressures. Politics cannot, in this view, be reduced to the aggregation of private interests. Such
interests are not preexisting. They are themselves a product of the political

29. Thus defined, the requirement that government action be justified by reference to
some public value, which is the minimal requirement imposed by the prohibition of naked
preferences, is more lenient than other liberal principles to which the requirement bears some
resemblance. See B. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 10-12 (1980) (neutrality);
R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 272-73 (1977) (equal concern and respect).
30. The Supreme Court has recently held that this justification for differential treatment
may in fact not be a public value. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 63 (1982). Whether
this decision heralds the beginning of stricter judicial enforcement of the prohibition of naked
preferences remains to be seen. See Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 Colum. L. Rev.
277, 303 n.142 (1984).
31. In theory, it would be possible to understand such trade-offs as promoting the public
good. Cf. Becker, supra note 24 (arguing pluralist trade-offs likely to produce more efficient
results than alternatives). But the courts have rarely done so.
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process, whose function is not to choose among preselected values but instead to select values through public deliberation and debate.
These competing portraits of the political process are of course caricatures of a far more complex reality.3 2 It is rare that government action is
based purely or exclusively on raw political power. Losers in the political
process may have lost for a very good reason that has little or nothing to do
with the power of their adversaries. Belief that an action will promote at
least some conception of the public good almost always plays at least some
role in government decisions. Moreover, it is rare for government action to
be based on a disembodied effort to discern and implement public values,
entirely apart from considerations of private pressure. What emerges is
therefore a continuum of government decisions, ranging from those that are
motivated primarily by interest-group pressures to those in which such pressures play a very minor role.3 3 The rest of Part I examines the devices used
by the courts to determine which of these poles a particular measure
approaches.
A.

The Minimal Requirement

If naked preferences are a legitimate basis for government action, a
significant judicial constraint on the exercise of government power is
lifted.3 4 It is sufficient that a particular group has been able to assemble the
raw political power to obtain what it seeks; might makes right. Under some
theories of legislation, the whole enterprise of government consists of efforts
by various groups to obtain the power to do precisely this. Modern pluralism, for example, depends in large part on the idea that competing groups
35
struggle, in a largely unprincipled fashion, to obtain a share of the pie. If
naked preferences are a legitimate basis for government behavior, there is
nothing wrong with that.
If naked preferences are forbidden, however, and the government is
forced to invoke some public value to justify its conduct, government behavior becomes constrained. The nature and extent of the constraint will
depend on several considerations. The first is the content of the category of
public values that courts will accept as a legitimate basis for government
32. See supra note 24.
33. See Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale LJ.
1013, 1022-23 (1984) (distinguishing "constitutional" and "ordinary" politics); Michelman,
Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local
Government Legitimacy, 53 Ind. L.J. 145, 194-99 (1977-78) (distinguishing public-interest
model and market-failure model in context of land-use regulation).
34. Of course, judicial enforcement of constitutional prohibitions may not be the only, or
even the most effective, constraint on government action. A host of other constraints exist.
Social conditioning imposes a set of values on legislators that prevents them from acting on
the basis of naked preferences in certain situations. Political pressure from constituents also
acts as a check on the types ofjustifications that legislators and other elected officials believe
they may advance. Indeed, it would be possible to conclude that the prohibition of naked
preferences ought to be enforced only through politics, and not through the courts.
35. See supra note 25.
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action. The constraint would be strengthened if, for example, the government were barred from relying on disfavored stereotypes of women or members of minority groups, on the ground that reliance on such stereotypes is
illegitimate and ought to be excluded from the category of public values.
The constraint would also be strengthened if a judicial decision were to
prohibit the redistribution of resources through regulation-say, regulation
that imposes minimum housing standards for poor tenants 3 6-- on the
ground that redistribution of this sort is a pure transfer of wealth and thus
should be assimilated to the category of naked preferences.
The second consideration relates to the devices developed to ensure
that public values do in fact account for legislation. If courts are willing to
hypothesize a public value as the basis for government action and do not
require a close fit between the public value and the measure under review,
all or almost all government action will be upheld. 3 7 By contrast, if courts
require a good reason to believe that a naked preference was not in fact at
work, many statutes may be invalidated.
This consideration raises the question of how courts are to determine
whether a public value accounts for legislation. Under a lenient test, any
legislation for which such a value can be hypothesized is automatically
valid. The fact that the statute satisfies the formal requirements for legislation, together with a not implausible connection between a public value
and the statute under review, would suffice to validate it. 38 A stricter test
might focus on both the legislative process and the outcome in order to
ensure against the possibility that even a formally unobjectionable enact39
ment was the result of a naked preference.
Let us assume that the category of public values has not been limited
at all, and that courts will not carefully scrutinize either the process or the
outcome to ensure that a public value was actually at work. These assumptions generate what might be called the "weak version" of the prohibition
of naked preferences. This version is characterized by two main features.
First, there is no category of impermissible ends beyond the prohibition of
decisions based solely on raw political power. Second, means-ends scrutiny
36. Whether and how such regulation will redistribute wealth is a sharply debated question. See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 16.8 (2d ed. 1977) (arguing redistribution will
not occur); Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing
Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 Yale LJ. 1093, 1096-98
(1971) (arguing redistribution will occur under various programs, including cash-payment
and in-kind programs); Komesar, Return to Slumville: A Critique of the Ackerman Analysis
of Housing Code Enforcement and the Poor, 82 Yale L.J. 1175, 1176, 1179-80 (1973) (arguing redistribution highly unlikely under cash-payment program); Markovits, The Distributive
Impact, Allocative Efficiency, and Overall Desirability of Ideal Housing Codes: Some Theoretical Clarifications, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1815, 1817 (1976) (contrasting redistribution under inkind and cash-payment programs).
37. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (deferential
review under commerce and equal protection clauses); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348
U.S. 483 (1955) (deferential review under due process clause).
38. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).
39. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 244-45 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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is deferential because courts will adopt a strong presumption that legislative
outcomes can be justified by reference to some public value.
The weak version, thus described, places only a minimal constraint on
government action, for it is nearly always possible to justify an action on
grounds other than the raw exercise of political power. But because the
weak version does require some justification that goes beyond raw political
power, it cannot be dismissed as a purely formal constraint. It forces those
who seek to obtain government assistance to invoke some public value as a
basis for assistance. In so doing, the weak version strikes two familiar constitutional themes. By requiring that a public value justify the exercise of
government power, it acts as a check on the danger of factional tyranny.
Moreover, it reflects the notion that the role of government is not to implement or trade off preexisting private interests, but to select public values.
The weak version accounts for much of modern constitutional doctrine. Rationality review is the prime example. Courts have interpreted
the due process and equal protection clauses as imposing the minimal requirement that government action be "reasonable." This corresponds to
the core demand of the weak version that government decisions based on
the exercise of raw political power be prohibited. Rationality review thus
represents a judicial search for some public value by which to justify the
measure in question.
Modern rationality review does not seek to rule out a separate category
of impermissible government ends; only exercises of raw political power are
expressly prohibited. 40 In the Lochner era, the Court attempted to create a
separate category of impermissible ends, using the libertarian framework of
the common law as a theoretical basis. Under that framework, the government's police power was sharply limited, and modern social legislation-for
example, maximum hour and minimum wage provisions-appeared not as
an effort to promote a public value, but instead as a raw exercise of political
power by the beneficiaries of the legislation. But the theoretical basis of the
Lochner era foundered on a mounting recognition that the market status quo
was itself the product of government choices. When private property was
viewed as a creation of such choices, efforts to reallocate property rights
could be understood as a legitimate effort to promote the public good. In
response to this new understanding, the category of impermissible government ends under the due process and equal protection clauses became
much narrower.
Modern rationality review is also characterized by extremely deferential means-ends scrutiny. The Supreme Court demands only the weakest
40. The category of exercises of raw political power includes what is treated as the same
thing-decisions based on the intrinsic value of treating one person better than another, or on
a desire to help, harm, or subordinate someone as an end in itself. Cf. B. Ackerman, supra
note 29, at 10-12 ("neutrality" principle). In practice, however, this is largely another way of
stating the weak version, for it is nearly always possible to justify government action by reference to some broader or more general consideration. See infra text accompanying notes
114-19 (discussing rationality review under the equal protection clause).
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link between a public value and the measure in question, and it is sometimes willing to hypothesize legitimate ends not realistically attributable to
the enacting legislature. As a result, few statutes fail rationality review.
This phenomenon raises the question whether the Court's commitment to
the prohibition of naked preferences, exemplified by the existence of rationality review, is merely rhetorical. This question, along with possible reasons
for the Court's deference, is explored below.
The weak version also accounts for much of modern doctrine under the
contract and eminent domain clauses. Under the contract clause, a state
may impair an obligation of contract only if it is able to show a connection
between the impairment and a public value. 41 But the category of public
values is very broad. Moreover, the connection between a public value and
the measure under review need not be tight; means-ends scrutiny is highly
deferential. The "public use" requirement of the eminent domain clause
reflects an identical framework: the prohibition of naked preferences, combined with a broad category of public values and deferential means-ends
42
scrutiny.
B.

Beyond the Minimal Requirement

The weak version of the prohibition of naked preferences may account
for much of current doctrine; but, as described thus far, it is minimal indeed. It merely requires something other than raw political power to justify
an exercise of authority. In most respects, this is a trivial constraint, for
almost any decision can be justified by reference to some public value. One
might, for example, support preferential treatment of the poor on the
ground that they have a special need for public assistance; preferential
treatment of the rich might be justified on the ground that it provides incentives for more work and investment. Discrimination in law enforcement
against racial minority groups might be justified on the ground that statistics show a propensity to violent crime among their members. 43 Both progressive and regressive taxes would be unobjectionable. Even segregation
might be explained on the ground that it is good for whites and blacks alike.
Everything, in short, is at least potentially lawful. To develop a more vigorous set of constraints on government, it is necessary to go beyond the weak
version described thus far.
The Constitution expressly provides a few-but only a few-of the elements of a more robust set of constraints. Under the privileges and immunities and dormant commerce clauses, a preference for in-staters at the
expense of out-of-staters is impermissible. Under the equal protection
clause, the same is true for discrimination against blacks. As a constitutional matter, both out-of-staters and blacks are entitled to special protec41. See infra notes 155-63 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 167-74 and accompanying text.
43. Cf. R. Posner, The Economics of Justice 376-77 (1981) (economic explanation of
discrimination).
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tion from discrimination; discrimination against either group for its own
sake cannot be understood as a public value.
Even these apparently express constraints, however, can be ambiguous.
What if a state justifies discrimination against out-of-staters on the ground
that they have been the main factor contributing to in-state unemployment,44 or discrimination against blacks on the ground that, when blacks
are jailed with whites, the likelihood of violence is dramatically increased? 45
Outside of the narrow areas of discrimination against out-of-staters and
blacks, the judicial inquiry is even more open-ended. To be sure, certain
constitutional provisions give some guidance. For example, it may be possible to derive from the equal protection clause a general principle by which
to judge all classifications. But in giving content to that principle, there is
enormous room for judgment. In such cases, how do the courts enforce the
prohibition of naked preferences?
In answering this question, we begin by examining several devices that
have been of special importance under all six clauses. These devices, which
are logically independent, have been the key elements in strengthening and
supplementing the constraint imposed by the weak version of the
prohibition.
1. HeightenedScrutiny. - The first device involves the scope of review
of government claims that a public value is being served. "Heightened
scrutiny" consists of a careful examination of the government's claim that a
public value is in fact the motivating force behind its actions. Here courts
find it insufficient, as a basis for a conclusion that a public value is at work,
that the measure under review has satisfied all formal requirements and a
connection can be hypothesized between it and some public value. Under
this approach, a public value is what emerges from a well-functioning political process in which legislators do not respond only to raw political power,
and courts will scrutinize the process to ensure that it is in fact well
functioning.
Heightened scrutiny involves two principal elements. The first is a requirement that the government show a close connection between the asserted public value and the means that the legislature has chosen to
promote it. If a sufficiently close connection cannot be shown, there is reason for skepticism that the asserted value in fact accounted for the legislation.46 The second element is a search for less restrictive alternatives-ways
in which the government could have promoted the public value without
harming the group in question.47 The availability of such alternatives also
suggests that the public value justification is a facade.
Heightened scrutiny also requires that the government show that it
44. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
45. See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam).
46. See J. Ely, supra note 26, at 145-48.
47. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281-83 (1979) (equal protection); United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1,29-31 (1977) (contract clause); Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-56 (1951) (commerce clause).
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actually considered the public value in enacting the measure in question. 48
Such a requirement represents a similar effort to ensure that the values on
which a statute rests are genuinely public, in the sense that they resulted not
from private pressure but from broad deliberation about what the relevant
rule should be. In this respect, the requirements of heightened scrutiny
serve as a means, though very tentative and undeveloped, of implementing
the republican ideal.
Heightened scrutiny is triggered by a concern that in the circumstances
it is especially likely that the measure under review reflects a naked preference. The most familiar example is review of racial classifications under the
equal protection clause. Review of statutes that discriminate on their face
against noncitizens under the privileges and immunities clause falls into the
same category. In both cases, heightened scrutiny is justified by a perception that the groups in question lack the political power to protect them49
selves against factional tyranny.
By contrast, more relaxed scrutiny-typified by rationality reviewreflects a strong presumption that a public value is at work. That presumption is conventionally supported by reference to considerations of judicial
competence and legitimacy. 50 The underlying idea is, first, that courts lack
the capacity to review the factual determinations of other branches of government and, second, that vigorous judicial scrutiny of whether a naked
preference is at work would be inconsistent with what is taken to be the
central constitutional commitment to representative democracy. 51
2. Theor of Impermissible Ends. - A second device in a more rigorous
version of the prohibition, typified by doctrines developed under the due
process and equal protection clauses, consists of judicial formulation of a
normative theory designed to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate bases for government action.52 The courts attempt to root this norma48. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 532, 548-54 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 212-17 (1977); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,
426 U.S. 88, 103, 114-16 (1976); Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
269, 299-303 (1975).
49. Under a pluralist conception, heightened scrutiny would be justified when it appeared that some group was not represented in the political process. The justification would
turn not on fear that a naked preference was at work, but instead on the presumptive invalidity of outcomes reached through a process unavailable to some. This justification accords
well with many of the cases, and it may be that the prohibition of naked preferences and
pluralism can be said to account equally well for much of modern doctrine calling for heightened scrutiny. But pluralism does not explain those aspects of heightened scrutiny that re-

quire not merely access to the political process, but also judicial scrutiny to ensure that the
process is one involving broad deliberation.
50. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-32 (1963) (due process); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 190-91 (1938) (commerce clause).
51. See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1,
2-8 (1971); Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 Neb. L. Rev. 197, 201-35 (1976).
52. The requirement of such a normative theory is the basis for recent suggestions that
the notion of equality requires some such theory to have content. See A. Gutmann, Liberal
Equality 10 (1980); Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1982). That
requirement also underlies recent attacks on the view, see B. Ackerman, supra note 29, that a
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tive theory in the text or history of the Constitution. Under this approach,
the weak version of the prohibition of naked preferences is buttressed by a
conclusion that a number of ends are illegitimate even if they are not exercises of raw political power in the ordinary sense. This element thus
supplements the procedural requirements of heightened scrutiny with a
substantive constraint.
During the Lochner era, for example, the redistribution of resources
from employer to employee was not thought to respond to a public value
and was therefore placed in the category of naked preferences. Numerous
goals now considered to fall within the realm of public values were not
recognized as such,5 3 largely because common law conceptions of rights and
obligations dominated early public law. 54 If a measure enacted by the government was not a proper exercise of the police power under common law
standards, it was impermissible under the due process clause as a naked
preference for one group at the expense of another. 55 Identical results occurred under the contract clause. 56 In short, a particular normative theory
sharply limited the category of public values.
Under current law, by contrast, all sorts of redistributive measures are
permissible. The weak version of the prohibition of naked preferences still
applies to such measures, but the normative theory supplementing the weak
version has been dramatically altered in a way that has expanded the category of public values to include redistribution. When a normative theory
outlaws certain kinds of government action even though such action is not
solely an exercise of raw political power, the prohibition of naked preferences has gone well beyond the weak version. To develop a complete theory of the resulting "strong version," it is necessary to identify the expanded
category of public values with precision.
The strong version could of course accommodate a wide range of normative theories of government. The Lochner era embodied one such theory.
Modern equal protection doctrine reflects another: courts do not recognize
as public values certain government ends associated with disadvantaging
57
women, aliens, illegitimates, and members of racial minority groups. For
example, the government has attempted to justify classifications based on
gender on the ground that women participate less frequently or less ably in
notion of neutrality has sufficient content to generate solutions to disputed issues. See, e.g.,
Fishkin, Can There be a Neutral Theory ofJustice?, 93 Ethics 348 (1983). The various strategies discussed in this Article are efforts to generate the requisite normative theory.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 133-38 (due process); infra text accompanying
note 169 (eminent domain).
54. See J. Vining, Legal Identity 13-27 (1978); Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1669, 1671-76 (1975).
55. See infra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (legitimacy); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976) (gender); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage).
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the labor market. 58 Although justifications of this sort would qualify as
public values under the weak version, very good reasons can be advanced
for prohibiting them under the strong version. Most important, such justifications may be based on values that are in fact merely reflections of existing
power relations. 59
The Court's suggestion that its skeptical attitude toward gender-based
classifications is designed to ensure that government action is "determined
through reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical application
of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men
and women" supports this point.60 In this sense, the strong version of the
prohibition is close to the weak; the difference is that the former, in its modern form, sometimes reflects a willingness to scrutinize public value justifications to see if they are actually rooted in, or are disguises for, private
power. But the unwillingness to permit justifications that reflect private
power, or are otherwise illegitimate, does go beyond the weak version.
The use of these theories of impermissible government ends as an additional source of constraints on government is highly controversial. For one
thing, the use of such theories may allow constitutional prohibitions to
change dramatically over time as the category of public values expands and
contracts-to many, a questionable phenomenon. 6 1 Moreover, selection of
public values is made by the judiciary-an allocation of authority that was
sharply criticized during the Lochner era and has its share of critics today, at
least when selection of the relevant values cannot easily be attributed to the
62
constitutional text and history.
The existence of a shifting and open-ended framework of public values
to supplement the weak version of the prohibition of naked preferences
makes development of a complete theory of the prohibition much more dif58. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975).
59. The relationship between particular values and private power-sometimes described
as "ideology"-raises complicated questions that cannot be explored here. For recent discussion by social theorists of how social and scientific knowledge are dependent on particular
interests, see M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge (1980); J. Habermas, Knowledge and Human
Interests (1971).
60. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982) (footnote omitted).
61. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 51; Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 85, 90-94.
62. Consensus-based theories, see Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional
Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 Yale LJ. 221 (1973), are open to familiar objections. See J. Ely, supra note 26, at 63-69; M. Perry, The Constitution, The Courts,
and Human Rights 94-97 (1982). Such theories may be made to depend not on actual consensus, but on the agreement that would emerge under circumstances of undominated discourse. Habermas' ideal speech situation is a familiar example. See Habermas, Towards a
Theory of Communicative Competence, 13 Inquiry 360, 372 (1970); Habermas, A Reply to
My Critics, in Habermas: Critical Debates 219, 234-37 (J. Thompson & D. Held eds. 1982);
cf. B. Ackerman, supra note 29, at 8-10 (constrained conversation). But these approaches
face difficulties of their own. See, e.g., Lukes, Of Gods and Demons: Habermas and Practical
Reason, in Habermas: Critical Debates, supra, at 134. See generally M. Sandel, Liberalism
and the Limits of Justice (1982) (attacking deontological theories of justice).
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ficult at both the positive and normative levels. For present purposes, it is
enough to recognize that the framework exists, to show how it goes beyond
the weak version of the prohibition, to describe its changes over time, and to
suggest some reasons why the changes may have occurred.
3. Rzghts Constraints.- The final device involves a category of rights
that operate as a shield against certain government actions even when no
naked preference has taken place. The Court's recognition of certain fundamental rights, including the right to "privacy," 63 falls in this category of
"rights constraints," as did the rights of contract recognized during the
Lochner era. This approach constrains government action not by assimilating certain justifications to the category of naked preferences, or by concluding that certain ends of government are impermissible, but by
invalidating measures even if they are properly motivated under the framework previously described. Rights constraints are sharply distinct from
both the weak and the strong versions of the prohibition of naked preferences. Far from making judicial decisions depend on the reasons for government action, such constraints create a shield of private autonomy that
operates regardless of the end the government is trying to achieve. 64 In this
respect, rights constraints reflect a normative framework altogether different from that underlying the prohibition of naked preferences.
The strong version of the prohibition of naked preferences is reflected
in much of modem constitutional law. Many areas of doctrine that cannot
be explained by the weak version can be explained by the strong. Most
prominently, the equal protection clause contains a theory of impermissible
ends that extends well beyond the prohibition of decisions based on raw
political power. Many of the justifications associated with decisions to single out women, aliens, and illegitimates for special treatment are regarded
as impermissible. Such justifications are not treated as public values at all,
though they are not exercises of raw political power in the ordinary sense.
Moreover, heightened scrutiny is readily applied to statutes that use such
characteristics as the basis for a classification. Such scrutiny is justified as a
means of ensuring that something other than the impermissible end accounts for the classification.
Elements of this framework are also reflected under the dormant commerce and privileges and immunities clauses. Here the category of impermissible ends includes decisions based on raw political power and-what
may often in practice be the same thing-decisions based on a perception
that it is intrinsically desirable to prefer in-staters over out-of-staters. When
a statute discriminates on its face between in-staters and out-of-staters,
heightened scrutiny is applied because of a perception that a naked preference is especially likely to be at work.
63. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113

(1973).
64. It would of course be possible to collapse rights constraints and theories of impermissible ends by concluding that the former is based on a willingness to declare certain government purposes to be illegitimate. But the focus of the two sets of constraints is very different.

HeinOnline -- 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1703 1984

1704

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1689

Finally, heightened scrutiny plays a role in modern contract clause
cases involving a state's abrogation of a contract to which it is a party.
Heightened scrutiny is justified in such cases by a suspicion that the state
may be acting for illegitimate reasons when it is an interested party.
A final preliminary point involves the relationship among the various
devices that have been developed to strengthen or supplement the weak
version of the prohibition of naked preferences. Although these devices are
frequently intertwined in practice, they are independent and can be applied
separately to constrain government action. For example, it would be possible to have an expansive conception of what counts as a public value and at
the same time adopt heightened scrutiny in cases in which it is especially
likely that a naked preference is at work. Indeed, some areas of current
doctrine under the contract and equal protection clauses reflect this approach. 65 Courts look skeptically at legislative outcomes because of a perception that raw political power is likely to be at work, but do not create a
category of impermissible ends as an additional source of constraints on
government action.
It would also be possible to impose a rights constraint regardless of
whether there were heightened scrutiny or any category of impermissible
ends. Under this approach, the category of rights would create a shield of
private autonomy into which the government could not intrude, regardless
of the reasons for the attempted intrusion. 66 As a result, invalidation would
be automatic, and heightened scrutiny unnecessary.
Finally, one could restrict the category of impermissible ends, but at
the same time abandon heightened scrutiny as incompatible with the
proper role of the courts in light of the separation of powers. As we will see,
however, it is more common to combine the three devices, generating a
regime of constraints that falls somewhere between the minimal requirement and the most intrusive versions of the prohibition of naked
preferences.
II.

APPLICATIONS:

NAKED PREFERENCES AND THE CLAUSES

This Part is primarily an effort to show the ways in which the various
elements of the framework introduced in Part I have interacted under all
six clauses as they have been interpreted in the last century or more. The
principal aim is to explore how both the weak version of the prohibition of
naked preferences and the various methods of supplementing it have been
used under the different clauses. This Part attempts to identify both significant overlaps in doctrine and differences over time and among clauses. At
times, however, it departs from description, criticizing some developments
and explaining or suggesting others.
65. Parts of equal protection doctrine, however, reflect a strong version of the prohibition. See infra notes 98-113 and accompanying text (strict scrutiny of racial classifications).
66. It is uncertain whether, as a matter of current constitutional doctrine, any such "absolute" rights can be said to exist.
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Dormant Commerce Clause

The commerce clause6 7 is both an authorization to Congress and, more
controversially, 68 a self-executing prohibition on certain state actions burdening interstate commerce-the so-called "dormant" commerce clause.
Under current doctrine, the dormant commerce clause is aimed primarily
at measures taken out of a desire to improve the economic position of instaters at the expense of out-of-staters. Illustrations of such protectionism in
its purest form are relatively rare, but Welton v. Missouri 69 is a good example. The Missouri statute at issue in Welton defined as "peddlers" persons
selling merchandise produced or manufactured outside the state and required all such persons to obtain licenses. No license was required for persons selling merchandise produced or manufactured inside the state. There
was no doubt that the statute had been enacted to protect in-state industries by insulating them from out-of-state competition. Underlying the
of the statute was a perception that it was based on this
Court's invalidation
70
naked preference.
The prohibition of protectionism in the dormant commerce clause rests
on a familiar political theory. When discrimination is worked against persons outside the state, ordinary avenues of political redress are unavailable
71
to the burdened class, which does not have access to the state legislature.
In the Welton case, for example, those who manufactured or produced merchandise outside of Missouri had little or no voice in the Missouri legislature.72 By contrast, when regulation imposes burdens on in-staters as well
as out-of-staters, the political safeguard is more reliable. 73 If, for example, a
state imposes safety regulations on persons who do construction within its
borders, in-staters will be affected in the same way as out-of-staters and
should represent the interests of out-of-staters adequately in the political
67. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
68. See, e.g., Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 Yale L.J. 425
(1982).
69. 91 U.S. 275 (1876).
70. Id. at 281-83.
71. See generally South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177
(1938) (judicial review of regulations burdening out-of-staters appropriate because normal
avenues of political redress closed); Eule, supra note 68 (judicial review justified when discriminatory or protectionist nature of legislation indicates breakdown in representational government); Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. Rev. 125
(judicial review appropriate when some affected interest excluded from political process).
72. To be sure, Missouri peddlers would have had some incentive to seek permission to
sell out-of-state merchandise, and to that extent would have represented the interests of outsiders. Consumers as well might have exerted pressure. But those sources of representation
are indirect and therefore less effective. See R. Hardin, Collective Action (1982); M. Olson,
The Logic of Collective Action 122-25 (1971).
73. Whether the Court's perception of the relative burdens on in-staters and out-of-staters is correct is a complex question. For discussion, see McLure, Incidence Analysis and the
Supreme Court: An Examination of Four Cases from the 1980 Term, 1 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev.
69 (1982).
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process. 74 Formally, of course, the dormant commerce clause is aimed not
at discrimination against out-of-staters, but against interstate commerce-a
point that the Court itself sometimes misses 5s But, in practice, discrimination against interstate commerce always turns out to be discrimination
against out-of-staters at one or the other end of the transaction.
To this extent, the dormant commerce clause reflects the prohibition of
naked preferences, weakly defined. The underlying notion is that when a
group of citizens enacts a measure of which they are the sole beneficiaries,
there is a peculiar likelihood that raw political power is at work. The absence of representation is undesirable not for its own sake, but because it
increases the likelihood that the legislature is acting on the basis of a naked
preference.7 6 In addition, the prohibition of protectionism results from a
perception that the dormant commerce clause reflects an authoritative
judgment that a state may not prefer its own citizens over out-of-staters
simply because it values their welfare more highly. In this respect, the dormant commerce clause forbids a conclusion that a preference for in-staters
over out-of-staters is a permissible public value.
Most of modern doctrine under the dormant commerce clause can be
derived from the theory of political representation discussed above in conjunction with the prohibition of naked preferences in favor of in-staters.
Cases like South CarolinaState Highway Department . Barnwell Brothers7 7 are at
one pole. At issue in Barnwell were width and weight limitations on trucks
used on state highways. The limitations, challenged on the ground that
they imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce, treated in-staters
the same as out-of-staters. For this reason, in cases like Barnwell,the Court's
scrutiny of legislation is highly deferential. It is sufficient to show that there
is a "rational basis" for the asserted benefits and that the burden on interstate commerce is not grossly excessive in relation to those benefits. 7 8 In the
absence of facial discrimination or discriminatory effects, there is no basis
for suspicion that a naked preference in favor of in-staters is at work.
In light of the absence of discrimination, why must the state make even
the minimal showing that the burdens imposed by the regulation are not
grossly excessive in relation to the benefits? One answer is that the dormant
commerce clause should invalidate regulations that interfere with free
trade, regardless of the legitimacy of the reasons for the interference. 79 An
alternative answer, more relevant for present purposes, is that such a re74. See Tushnet, supra note 71, at 139-40.
75. See, e.g., South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177
(1938).
76. This point is missed in both Ely, supra note 26, and Tushn'et, supra note 71.
77. 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
78. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Southern Pac. Co.
v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303
U.S. 177 (1938).
79. Such an approach, which has support in the cases, would posit a purpose for the
dormant commerce clause other than preventing protectionism. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). The emphasis of the recent cases, however, is on protecHeinOnline -- 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1706 1984
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quirement "filters out" illegitimate motivations. When the asserted benefits
turn out to be illusory, or are minimal in relation to the burdens imposed,
there is good reason to suspect that an illegitimate motivation--something
other than the asserted benefits-in fact accounts for the regulation. 80 It is
highly unlikely that protectionism would account for a nondiscriminatory
restriction, and the judicial approach is therefore deferential. Nevertheless,
judicial review operates as a check against the possibility of covert
protectionism.
At the opposite pole from Barnwell are cases involving regulations that
distinguish on their face between persons who are involved in interstate
commerce and those who are not. In Welton v. Missouri,8 1 for example, the
burden of the statute fell entirely on out-of-staters; 82 the benefits were enjoyed entirely by in-staters. The Court has applied either a per se rule83 or
a strong presumption 84 of invalidity to such classifications. In such cases
there is reason for suspicion that raw political power, not a public value,
accounts for the legislation. The presumption of invalidity can be overcome, if at all, only by showing, first, an extremely close connection between the asserted public value and the statutory enactment and, second,
that less restrictive alternatives are unavailable. For example, in Hughes v.
Oklahoma8 5 the Court was faced with a state statute prohibiting the transportation outside the state of minnows seined or procured from waters
within the state. The Court found that the asserted interest-conservation
and protection of wildlife-could be served in ways that did not discriminate against interstate commerce; for example, by limiting the number of
minnows that could be seined by licensed dealers. If the state had been able
to make both of the required showings, the presumption that the public
86
value was a sham would have been overcome.
In many cases, however, the Supreme Court has condemned as protectionism statutes that did not discriminate on their face between in-staters
tionism. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
80. This form of analysis is parallel to that employed in rationality review under the
equal protection clause. There, too, the examination of whether a rational basis exists for a
classification serves largely as a check on illegitimate motivations; there, too, the test is deferential because it is adopted when there is no reason to suspect that an illegitimate motivation
is at work. See infra notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
81. 91 U.S. 275 (1876).
82. See supra text accompanying note 69.
83. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Baldwin v. G.A.F.
Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
84. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) ("At a minimum such facial
discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and of
the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives.").
85. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
86. This branch of dormant commerce clause doctrine is paralleled by the treatment
given to statutes that classify on their face on the basis of race. Outside of the area of affirmative action, see, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), such statutes face a similar
rule of presumptive or per se invalidity.
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and out-of-staters. In Dean Milk Co. v.City of Madison,87 for example, the
relevant provision required distributors of milk to pasteurize their goods
within five miles of Madison, Wisconsin. Although this requirement burdened many Wisconsin citizens who had to travel close to Madison to sell
their milk, its greatest impact fell on out-of-staters. For this reason, the
Court employed a form of heightened scrutiny, searching for less restrictive
alternatives. The Court found that such altematives-for example, inspection of distant milk sources-were available to serve the city's asserted
safety goals. In other cases involving facially nondiscriminatory statutes,
the Court has usually reacted to a showing of discriminatory effect by requiring a close connection between legitimate ends and statutory means
and by looking to the existence of less restrictive alternatives. 8
The reasons for this development should be clear. Once it is shown
that a statute has a disproportionate adverse effect on out-of-staters, or gives
disproportionate benefits to in-staters, there is reason to suspect that a naked preference in fact accounted for the legislation. An examination of the
means-ends relationship and of less restrictive alternatives filters out such
preferences. To be sure, there is less reason for suspicion here than in cases
involving regulations that discriminate on their face against out-of-staters.
When burdens fall disproportionately on out-of-staters, but are felt by some
in-staters as well, redress through political representation is to some extent
available. The disadvantaged in-staters ought to represent the interests of
the out-of-staters. But the comparative inadequacy of the representation
afforded under such circumstances is reason for somewhat less deference by
the Court.
Current doctrine under the dormant commerce clause thus emerges as
a relatively simple structure. The principal prohibited end is protectionism-measures that reflect an exercise of raw political power by in-staters at
the expense of out-of-staters. That perception of the prohibited end is reflected in a three-part doctrinal framework: a per se rule or strong presumption of invalidity applied to measures that discriminate on their face
against interstate commerce; heightened scrutiny, in the form of examination of less restrictive alternatives and means-ends review, when the burdens
fall disproportionately on interstate commerce, the benefits accrue mostly to
intrastate commerce, or both; and deferential review when there is no discrimination at all. To a large extent, all three parts of the doctrinal framework attempt to filter out naked preferences for in-staters over out-ofstaters.
B.

Privileges and Immunities Clause
The privileges and immunities clause of article IV provides that "Citi-

87. 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
88. See Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). The
Court's treatment of cases involving disproportionate impact has not, however, been consistent. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (upholding statute
despite discriminatory effects).
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zens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."8' 9 The basic themes of the clause are almost
identical to those of the dormant commerce clause.
The privileges and immunities clause received its preeminent modern
interpretation in Toomer v. Witsell.90 At issue was a South Carolina law that
imposed license fees on boats engaging in commercial shrimp fishing. The
fee was $25 for citizens, $2500 for noncitizens. The Supreme Court said
that the function of the privileges and immunities clause was to "bar discrimination against citizens of other States where there is no substantial
reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of
other States." 9 1 This is a classic description of the constitutional prohibition of naked preferences. Disparate treatment of citizens and noncitizens is
permissible only when "there are perfectly valid independent reasons for
it."'92 The question under the clause, according to the Court, was "whether
such reasons do exist and whether the degree of discrimination bears a close
93
relation to them."
In Toomer itself, the Court noted that the statute discriminated on its
face against noncitizens. Such discrimination justified skepticism about the
state's asserted purpose, conservation of the shrimp supply, because the absence of ordinary avenues of political redress for noncitizens increased the
danger that the discriminatory enactment was an exercise of raw political
power.9 4 As under the dormant commerce clause, such skepticism requires
an examination of whether the asserted purpose can be served by alternative nondiscriminatory means. In Toomer, such means were obviously
89. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2.
90. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
91. Id. at 396.
92. Id.
93. Id. (footnote omitted).
94. Cases decided after Thomer reflect a similar understanding of the function of the privileges and immunities clause. See, e.g., United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of
Camden, 104 S. Ct. 1020 (1984); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
The Camden case involved a municipal ordinance requiring that at least 40% of the employees of contractors and subcontractors working on city construction projects be Camden
residents. The Court held that the ordinance was subject to the privileges and immunities
clause notwithstanding the fact that it adversely affected New Jersey citizens as well as noncitizens. According to the Court, the disproportionate effect of the ordinance justified scrutiny
under the clause:
Given the Camden ordinance, an out-of-state citizen who ventures into New Jersey
will not enjoy the same privileges as the New Jersey citizen residing in Camden. It
is true that New Jersey citizens not residing in Camden will be affected by the ordinance as well .... But New Jersey residents at least have a chance to remedy at
the polls any discrimination against them. Out-of-state citizens have no similar opportunity ....

104 S. Ct. at 1027. Camden is the privileges and immunities analogue of Dean Milk Co. v.
City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), which held that a municipal ordinance having disproportionate effects on out-of-staters was subject to heightened scrutiny under the dormant
commerce clause. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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available. 95
There is a substantial overlap between the privileges and immunities
clause and the dormant commerce clause. Both are aimed at discrimination against out-of-staters. Both focus on the theme of political representation, justifying an active judicial posture when discrimination alerts courts
to the likelihood that unrepresented persons have been harmed.
At the same time, there are three differences between the two clauses.
First, while both protect out-of-staters, the dormant commerce clause is formally aimed at discrimination against interstate commerce, not against outof-staters. For this reason, a plaintiff attacking a measure as protectionist
under the dormant commerce clause need not be an out-of-stater. At the
same time, a plaintiff under the privileges and immunities clause need not
show that commerce is involved at all. Second, the privileges and immunities clause is not triggered unless the discrimination operates against a "fundamental right." 96 Third, doctrine under the privileges and immunities
clause has a much simpler, perhaps much cruder structure. The clause generally has been invoked only upon a showing of facial discrimination
against noncitizens. Discriminatory effects have rarely been sufficient to
trigger any scrutiny at all. 97 The availability of the dormant commerce
clause as the doctrinal avenue for invalidating discriminatory state action,
at least where commerce is concerned, may have produced this development by relieving the pressure for use of the privileges and immunities
clause as a barrier against such discrimination. In any event, despite their
differences the two clauses are aimed at substantially identical evils.
C.

EqualProtection Clause

The equal protection clause is not concerned solely with the special
case of discrimination between in-staters and out-of-staters; its prohibition
is far broader. Indeed, in many respects the clause may be understood as a
generalization of the core concerns of the dormant commerce and privileges
and immunities clauses, applying their basic prohibition of naked preferences to all classifications.
Discrimination against blacks, the central evil at which the equal protection clause was aimed, is the equal protection analogue of discrimination
against out-of-staters under the dormant commerce and privileges and immunities clauses. The doctrinal framework for addressing the central evil is
formally almost identical under the three clauses. When a statute discriminates on its face against blacks, the Court applies a per se rule or strong
95. For example, shrimp conservation could be ensured through limiting the number of
shrimp that fishermen could take.
96. See Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
97. But see United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 104 S. Ct.
1020, 1027 (1984) (disproportionate effects on out-of-staters trigger stricter scrutiny). See gcnerally Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 487 (1981) (discussing proper scope under privileges and immunities and dormant commerce clauses of state
authority to favor state residents in distribution of public resources).
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presumption of invalidity. 98 The presumption, here as elsewhere, can be
overcome only by showing a legitimate and "compelling" government interest and an extremely close connection between that interest and the particular means chosen by the government to promote it. 99
Thus, for example, in Korematsu v. United States' 0 0 -the first case employing "strict scrutiny"-the Court upheld a statute placing JapaneseAmericans in relocation centers on the ground that the discrimination
rested neither on raw political power nor on a perception that the JapaneseAmericans were worse than anyone else, but on a neutral desire to promote
national security. The Court relied on the importance of the state interest
and the perceived closeness of the connection between that interest and the
measure under review. In the Court's view, these considerations justified
the conclusion that the state's decision was not a naked preference at all. 10 '
Other cases use the same devices as a means of filtering out naked
preferences. 102
One reason for heightened scrutiny is a belief that when a statute discriminates on its face against racial minorities, a naked preference is almost
certainly at work. Here, as under the dormant commerce and privileges
and immunities clauses, a familiar political theory helps to account for that
belief. The relative political powerlessness of members of minority groups is
a classic reason for active judicial scrutiny of statutes that disadvantage
them.10 3 The notion is that the ordinary avenues of political redress are
much less likely to be available to minorities, and the danger that such
statutes will result from an exercise of raw political power is correspondingly increased. The equal protection context is of course different in that
the political remedy is formally available to members of the protected
group; the doctrinal framework is based on the functional rather than literal absence of a political remedy.' 0 4 By contrast, when discrimination is
worked against whites, as in affirmative action legislation, there is good reason to suppose that the government motivation will be entirely different. 105
98. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399
(1964).
99. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); cf. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J.) (finding such a connection in the context of affirmative action for minority medical school applicants).
100.

323 U.S. 214 (1944).

101. Id. at 223-24. This is hardly to say that Koremalsu was rightly decided. The meansends connection was not as tight as normally required. See, e.g., Anderson v. Martin, 375
U.S. 399 (1964).
102. See, e.g., Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
103. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). It is no
coincidence that Justice Stone was the author of both Carolene Products and Barnwell Bros.,
where a substantially similar theory spawned the modem development of the dormant commerce clause. For a generalization of this theory, see J. Ely, supra note 26.
104. See J. Ely, supra note 26, at 145-70.
105. See K. Greenawalt, Discrimination and Reverse Discrimination (1983); Ely, The
Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723, 735 (1974).
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As a result, the same degree of scrutiny is not applied.106
In one sense, then, the equal protection framework might be understood as derivative of the weak version of the prohibition of naked preferences, combined with heightened scrutiny in cases in which the prohibition
is likely to be violated. But current equal protection doctrine goes beyond
the use of heightened scrutiny and also employs the device of impermissible
ends. The category of prohibited ends includes a wide range of justifications that involve more than exercises of raw political power. Segregation
in prisons, for example, has been justified on the ground that, when blacks
are jailed with whites, there is an increased likelihood of violence-and
surely preventing violence is a public value.'0 7 All sorts of measures that
disadvantage blacks have been similarly justified. 10 8 Such measures are
presumed invalid because of a concern not that they are based on raw political power, but that they depend on impermissible attitudes towards blacks.
The matter becomes even clearer in cases involving judicial scrutiny of
classifications drawn on the basis of gender, alienage, and legitimacy. 10 9
For example, when a statute provides that the spouses of male workers automatically qualify for social security benefits, but that spouses of female
workers must show dependency, the classification hardly reflects an exercise
of raw political power, but instead reflects certain-perhaps invidiousconceptions about female participation in the labor market. The Court's
willingness to invalidate such statutes 110 cannot be explained as an enforcement of the minimal requirement alone.
All of this suggests that, in the equal protection context, the Court has
adopted the strong version of the prohibition of naked preferences, ruling
out, as impermissible bases for differential treatment, a wide range of legislative judgments about certain social groups. We have suggested that the
strong version goes far beyond the minimal requirement that classifications
rest on something other than raw power."1 In the equal protection context, the strong version embodies a complex normative framework. In part,
the framework is the logical outgrowth of a theory that prohibits government from treating one person differently from another solely on the
ground that it is intrinsically desirable to do so."12 The framework also
106. Although the precise constitutional status of affirmative action is unsettled, it seems
clear that it will be treated more deferentially than discrimination against blacks. See, e.g.,
Fullilove v. KJutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (Burger, C.J.); id. at 517 (Marshall, J., concurring); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (Powell, J.); id. at 324
(Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
107. See Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
108. In Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), to take the most famous example,
the defendants attempted to justify segregation on the ground that it was best for all concerned, not on the ground that it was intrinsically desirable to treat whites better than blacks.
109. See supra note 57.
110. See supra note 58.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 43-64.
112. See Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause,
1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. 127.
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reflects changing social conceptions about the role and status of the relevant
groups. Such conceptions have made justifications involving the inability
of women to compete in the job market, or the punishment of adultery
through adverse treatment of the illegitimate, seem increasingly intolerable-not public values at all. Justifications of that sort, it is thought, both
reflect and perpetuate existing relations of power and are not the product of
reasoned analysis. In this respect, the Court's skeptical attitude toward
such justifications reflects a willingness to scrutinize apparent public values
3
to see whether they are in fact the product of raw political power."1
In cases involving review of classifications for "rationality," however,
equal protection doctrine embodies a weak version of the prohibition. Although the rationality test is highly deferential, its function is to ensure that
classifications rest on something other than a naked preference for one person or group over another. Thus, to take the most familiar example, in
W'lliamson v. Lee Optical,Inc.,' 14 the Court upheld differential treatment of
optometrists and opticians on the ground not that the equal protection
clause tolerated an unprincipled distribution of wealth to one rather than to
the other-though there is a plausible argument that such a naked preference was indeed taking place--but that the differential treatment was a
means of protecting consumers. 1 5 The Court has made clear in rationality
cases that the government must be able to invoke some public value that
the classification at issue can be said to serve.116 The Court has invalidated
classifications for which the government is unable to invoke a plausible
public value justification," 7 thereby demonstrating that the function of rationality review is to enforce the weak version of the prohibition of naked
preferences.
To be sure, rationality review under the equal protection clause, as
elsewhere, is highly deferential and almost always results in the validation
of statutory classifications. The Court has demanded only the loosest fit
113. How such judicial attitudes change over time, and how they should interact with
the equal protection clause, are questions that need not be explored here. Cf. J. Vining, Legal
Identity 171 (1978) ("we do not know how a value becomes a public value"). It is sufficient
for present purposes to show that the equal protection clause reflects the strong version of the
prohibition of naked preferences because it refuses to recognize certain justifications even
though they go beyond the exercise of raw political power.
114. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
115. According to the Court, "there can be no doubt that the presence and superintendence of the specialist tend to diminish an evil," and the "legislature might have concluded
that the frequency of occasions when a prescription is necessary was sufficient to justify" the
regulation. Id. at 487 (citation omitted).
116. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483-85 (1970); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106,
110 (1949).
117. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982); Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528 (1973). It is probably no coincidence that Zobel, one of the few cases in which
the Court has invalidated a statute on rationality grounds, had strong overtones of discrimination between in-staters and out-of-staters. See 457 U.S. at 71-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in the judgment) (relying on privileges and immunities clause).
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between the classification and the relevant public value and has been willing to hypothesize public values-legitimate legislative purposes-even in
cases in which it seems highly unlikely that such purposes actually accounted for the measure under attack.1 18 Such results may lead to understandable skepticism about whether the rationality constraint-the weak
version of the prohibition of naked preferences-is a constraint at all."19
Rationality review is of course the equal protection analogue of cases
involving nondiscrimination under the dormant commerce clause. The
equal protection clause forbids naked preferences, but the standard of review indicates the Court's belief that it ought to be extremely reluctant to
conclude that a naked preference has in fact occurred. Undoubtedly, this
12 0
reluctance can be attributed in part to separation of powers concerns,
reflecting a judgment that although naked preferences are prohibited the
courts ought to create a strong presumption that they hardly ever occur.
There is considerable awkwardness in attributing an impermissible motivation to a coordinate branch of government. The reluctance might also be
justified by the familiar difficulties in divining legislative purpose: legislatures always act on the basis of mixed motives, and the case of a "pure"
interest group transfer may be rare. Perhaps, too, the Court is reluctant to
enforce the notion, to which its rhetoric steadfastly adheres, that the Constitution requires that some public value justify government action. 12 1
In the rationality area, then, modern equal protection doctrine reflects
the weak version of the prohibition of naked preferences. Heightened scrutiny is unavailable, and no background normative theory limits the ends
that government may seek. Only a few rights are said to be fundamental
for equal protection purposes, generating an infrequent rights-based constraint on government action in pursuit of public values.' 22 Almost every
classification survives rationality review.
This general understanding of the equal protection clause fits nicely
with the requirement that a litigant show that the government decisionmaker acted out of an impermissible motivation. 123 Under this understanding, the clause is centrally concerned with the reasons for differential
treatment; effects themselves are irrelevant. But many classifications may
be impermissibly motivated under the equal protection clause even though
118. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981); United States R.R. Retirement
Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
119. See Linde, supra note 51, at 201-22; Posner, supra note 25, at 28-30.
120. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc.,
348 U.S. 483, 496 (1955).
121. For such a conclusion, see Linde, supra note 51, at 244-48; Posner, supra note 25, at
27. Cf. Stewart, supra note 14, at 1547-55 (criticizing interest-group theory and indicating its
inconsistency with judicial and political process, rhetoric, and results).
122. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667-68 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
123. See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273-74 (1979); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 244-48 (1976).
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they are not based on a desire to harm. 124 The notion of impermissible
motivation encompasses a wide range of classifications based on a perception that blacks should be treated differently from whites, women differently from men, or aliens differently from citizens. In ascertaining the
prohibited intent, the relevant question is not whether the state intended to
hurt the group in question, but whether the state would have enacted the
measure under attack regardless of which groups were helped and which
hurt. 25 The question, in short, is whether the state operated in a way that
was unaffected by the fact that a particular group benefited from or was
burdened by the measure in question. In all cases in which no such neutrality is shown, it is likely that an impermissible motivation in fact accounted
for the measure.
This general understanding also helps explain the careful scrutiny that
the Court has applied to statutes disadvantaging certain other groups, including women, illegitimates, and aliens.' 26 Here, as elsewhere, a partial
justification for applying heightened scrutiny is a perception that such
groups have relatively little political power, increasing the danger that the
statute in question was the product of an impermissible motivation. The
vision of the prohibited end-government action resulting from a naked
preference-is close to what it is in the race and rationality cases; the doctrinal framework accommodates a perception that, in terms of the likelihood
that this end will occur, these are intermediate cases.
Modern equal protection doctrine can be attacked on two primaryand opposing-grounds, each of which is best seen as responding to the
general understanding of the clause discussed above. The first ground for
attack is that the political process is filled with decisions based on exercises
of raw political power, and that there is nothing wrong with that. 27 Under
this view, rationality review is a sham, threatening either hypocrisy about
the real reasons for statutory enactments-public value justifications in
cases in which the usual pluralist struggle is taking place-or judicial invalidation of the many statutes that are best explained as resulting from exercises of raw political power.
The second ground for attack is based on several related arguments.
The first argument is that modem equal protection doctrine rests on an
untenable premise that outside of a few limited contexts-race, gender,
alienage, and perhaps illegitimacy-the political process can be trusted as a
124. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 233-34 (1981) (relevant intent is intent to
classify rather than intent to harm).
125. See Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 6-8 (1976). An unfortunate consequence of the requirement of discriminatory purpose is that institutional practices generating discriminatory results are immunized from attack. Such results often derive from a series of decisions made by many people, no one of
whom can be charged with impermissible motivation. It is for this reason that the discriminatory purpose requirement has stood as a barrier to recent attacks on administration of the
death penalty. See Stephens v. Kemp, 104 S. Ct. 562, 564-65 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting).
126. See supra note 57.
127. See Linde, supra note 51, at 222-35; Posner, supra note 25, at 27-28.
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safeguard against naked preferences.' 28 The notion that, outside of these
unusual contexts, the political process can serve as an impartial mechanism
for "summing up the opinions of the citizenry" 129 reflects the adoption of a
highly controversial model of government and personality.130 This argument maintains that the pluralist understanding that a wide range of
groups can protect themselves through politics blinks reality. The second
argument is that the Court's willingness to hypothesize legitimate purposes
and to accept remote connections between those purposes and statutory
classifications produces a doctrinal framework that, in practice, involves no
judicial scrutiny at all. In this respect, the Court's commitment to the prohibition of naked preferences might be seen as merely rhetorical. The final
argument is that the effort to generate public value justifications serves an
indefensible legitimating function, forcing lawyers and judges to talk in
terms of public values even though naked wealth transfers are taking place.
The public values discourse tends to obscure the actual power relations behind most modern legislation while at the same time providing an apparently legitimate basis for upholding it.
These attacks suggest that a more vigorous equal protection doctrine
would protect a wide range of other groups from disabilities created by the
political process. In addition, it would raise the level of means-ends scrutiny, thus responding to the suggestion that rationality review is too deferential in practice. Under this approach, the separation-of-powers objections
to such a judicial role are an insufficient basis for refusal to implement the
constitutionally mandated prohibition of naked preferences. Such an
approach would, in these and other respects, expand considerably on the
very tentative efforts of current doctrine to ensure that the relevant values
are genuinely public13 ' by creating procedural and substantive devices
designed to diminish the risk that government decisions result from the
32
pressures produced by preexisting private interests.1
These attacks also call into serious question the coherence of the modem understanding of what the equal protection clause is aimed at, or at
least the adequacy of modern devices used to implement the clause. But for
purposes of the present discussion, it is not necessary to evaluate these attacks in detail. The critical point here is that equal protection doctrine
encompasses weak and strong versions of the prohibition of naked preferences. That evil is very close to the core concerns of the dormant commerce
and privileges and immunities clauses. The various attacks grow out of per128. See, e.g., Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-And Its Future, 42 Ohio St.
LJ.223 (1981); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 561, 602-16
(1983); see also The Bias of Pluralism (W. Connolly ed. 1969) (positive and normative attack
on pluralism); T. Spragens, supra note 24 (same).
129. See Unger, supra note 128, at 607.
130. Id. at 607-15.
131. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
132. Such developments would parallel recent trends in administrative law. See Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 Sup. Ct. Rev. 177.
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ceptions that the evil is not an evil at all, or on the contrary that the Court
ought to enforce the prohibition much more vigorously.
D.

Due Process Clause

Similar considerations apply to constitutional tests for rationality
under the due process clause. Because of the substantial identity of the
standards under this clause and the equal protection clause, a brief discussion should suffice.
The notion that legislation is unconstitutional if it represents a naked
decision to distribute resources to one group rather than to another came
13 3
through most clearly in the Lochner era. In Mugler v. Kansas, for example,
the Court noted that the test is whether "a statute purporting to have been
enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public
3a
safety" has a "real or substantial relation to these objects"' -the same
question the Court now asks under the equal protection clause.
There are, however, several differences between the two clauses. The
first relates to what falls within the category of public values. Here the
Lochner case is itself the best illustration. The statute at issue there prohibited employment in a bakery for more than sixty hours per week or ten
hours per day. The question whether the measure fell within the "police
power," as understood by the Court, translated into the question whether it
35
involved "the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public."
In Lochner, the Court held that no public value was served. "It seems to us
that the real object-and purpose were simply to regulate the hours of labor
between the master and his employees. . . in a private business, not dangerous in any degree to morals or in any real and substantial degree, to the
health of the employees." 1 36 The same position can be found in many
cases.*37
In this respect, the Lochner Court regarded redistribution on an ad hoc
basis as an essentially private taking from one person to another, a measure
based on raw political power or on the intrinsic desirability of treating the
benefited better than the burdened group. A now familiar problem with
the Lochner reasoning is its perception of the market status quo as natural or
38
preexisting-not as a matter of conscious choice.1 It was as if the Court
did not "see" certain values, generally including redistribution, as legitimate public ends. For this reason, in part, an effort to regulate the hours of
labor was considered an impermissible taking from A in order to benefit B.
133. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
134. Id. at 661.
135. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
136. Id. at 64.
137. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236
U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S.

578 (1897).
138. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685, 1746-51 (1976).
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The decline of the Lochner era represented a dramatic broadening of the
category of public values. This was brought about by an understanding of
how the operation of the private sector is dependent on public choices.
Once it became clear that harms produced by the marketplace were also
the products of public choices, efforts to alleviate those harms came to be
regarded as permissible exercises of government power.
In the post-Lochner era, a wide range of justifications count as exercises
of the police power and are not treated as naked wealth transfers. The
police power is properly used to safeguard the interests of groups or subgroups of workers, of consumers, of the victims of discrimination. There has
thus been a shift from the strong to the weak version of the prohibition of
naked preferences. One consequence of this development has been to make
the line between naked preference and public value quite thin in practice,
as we saw earlier in connection with the weak version of the basic prohibition. If protection of the class of statutory beneficiaries is itself seen as a
public value, many exercises of raw political power-even if in the service
of faction-become automatically justifiable. Current law reflects such
perceptions. '3 9
The second difference relates to the nature of judicial scrutiny of the
state's justifications. In the Lochner era, the Court did not merely limit the
permissible ends of government, but also demanded a fairly close fit be40
tween those ends and enactments attacked as naked wealth transfers.'
Again, the best example is Lochner itself, where the Court found an insufficient connection between protection of the health of bakers and maximum
hour legislation. There is no question that the connection would pass modern scrutiny under the rationality test: a legislative judgment that there is a
connection between health impairment and workdays of more than ten
hours is surely a rational one. Thus, with respect to means-ends scrutiny as
well, the Lochner era reflected a highly intrusive version of the prohibition of
naked preferences. The expansion in legitimate ends under current doctrine has been accompanied by a relaxation in the required means-ends
connection, resulting in an extremely weak version of the basic prohibition.
Modern due process doctrine contains at least one holdover from the
Lochner era. When government action places an undue burden on a fundamental right-most prominently, the right to "privacy"14 '-the action is
unconstitutional. In this respect, modern doctrine under the due process
clause has gone beyond the weak version of the prohibition of naked preferences. A fundamental right operates as a barrier to government action even
if no naked preference is at work. An action may have been properly motivated-in the sense that something other than an exercise of raw political
power generated it-but nonetheless be invalid because it invades the realm
of personal autonomy.
139. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); City of
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
140. See supra note 137.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
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Contract Clause

The contract clause prohibits states from passing any "Law impairing
the Obligation of Contracts."' 42 The clause was enacted in response to a
perception that contracts were entitled to special protection from government control. In the framers' view, recent history had shown that contractual obligations frequently had been abrogated because of the acquisition of
political power by those who had made agreements that later turned out to
disadvantage them. This was considered especially true in the context of
debtor relief laws. 143 In short, the constitutional concern about the capture
by faction was a prominent theme behind the contract
of government
44
clause. 1
For a long period, the clause operated as a significant constraint on
government action, 45 but eventually it became clear that the nature and
extent of the constraint would depend on whether there was a police power
exception to the general prohibition against contractual impairments. In
early decisions, the Court held that there was such an exception.1 46 If a
state was acting pursuant to the police power, it could impair an obligation
of contract, and it need not provide the disappointed party with compensation for the impairment. The rationale for the police power limitation was
that the contract clause was not intended to interfere with the reserved sovereignty of the state. Surely the clause was not meant to prevent a state
from outlawing a contract for murder or for the sale of heroin,14 7 even if the
impairing law applied retroactively.
Even after the recognition of a police power exception, however, the
contract clause remained a significant limitation on state action because the
police power was itself highly restricted. At common law, the government's
exercise of that power was limited to a few conventional ends-most prominently, protection of its citizens from conduct that was tortious, or the functional equivalent of tortious, at common law.1 48 There was no general
142. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
143. B. Wright, The Contract Clause of the Constitution 4-5 (1938).
144. See Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contracts Clause, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev.
703 (forthcoming 1984).
145. See G. Gunther, Constitutional Law 554-57 (10th ed. 1980); Hale, The Supreme
Court and the Contract Clause (pts. 1-3), 57 Harv. L. Rev. 512, 621, 852 (1944).
146. See Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814
(1880).
147. See Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905):
[T]he interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent
the State from exercising such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of the
common weal. . . . This power, which in its various ramifications is known as the
police power. . . is paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals.
This result was not inevitable. It would have been possible to provide that such retroactive impairments demanded compensation or equitable relief. But the Manigaultreading best
comports with the intended function of the clause. See Epstein, supra note 144; cf. Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386 (1798) (limiting ex post facto clause to criminal cases and thus
allowing subsequent impairments of contractual obligations).
148. See E. Freund, The Police Power, Public Policy and Constitutional Rights 4-12
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authority to engage in the wide range of activities of modern government:
protecting victims of discrimination, providing pensions and social security
benefits, helping consumers from dislocations caused by the market, As
under the due process clause, the expansion in the conception of the permissible ends of government rendered the contract clause at best a sporadic
limit on government authority. The shift, in short, has been from the strong
to the weak version of the prohibition of naked preferences.
The key case in this shift was Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell.149 It involved a Minnesota mortgage moratorium statute that allowed
courts to postpone the time for redemption from foreclosure sales for a period of thirty days, with the possibility of a further limited extension. The
consequence of the statute was to relieve debtors of their contractual obligations to lenders-precisely the evil at which the contract clause was originally aimed.
The critical step in the Blaisdell Court's reasoning was its conclusion
that the state's control over private contracts extended not only to remedies,
but also to all other authority deemed necessary "to safeguard the vital interests of its people."15 0 This "reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power," the Court said, was to be "read into contracts as a postulate of
the legal order."' 5' The question as thus conceived was "whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end."' 52 This standard would not allow a
state "to adopt as its policy the repudiation of debts or the destruction of
contracts or the denial of means to enforce them."' 5 3 But it would permit
the immediate and literal
use of the police power "in directly preventing
54
enforcement of contractual obligations."'
One consequence of Blaisdell was to recognize a police power limit
built into the contract clause. But that was hardly controversial. The real
shift came in the understanding of what the police power allowed, a shift
that resulted in a dramatic expansion of the permissible ends of government. When government action was no longer limited to protection against
common law torts or analogous conduct, and the state could intervene to
(1904). For a modern effort to reassert this understanding of the police power, see R. Epstein,
On Eminent Domain: The Unification of Public and Private Law ch. 8 (1985) (forthcoming)
(copy on file at the offices of the Columbia Law Review). Such accounts are vulnerable for
the same reasons that underlie the demise of the Lochner understanding of the police power:
they define the permissible ends of government by reference to the principles of the common
law.

149. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
150. Id. at 434.
151. Id. at 435.
152. Id. at 438.
153. Id. at 439.
154. Id. at 440. The Court was aware that its interpretation of the clause differed in
significant ways from that of the framers. See generally C. Miller, The Supreme Court and
the Uses of History 39-51 (1969) (discussing Blaisdell Court's treatment of historical
evidence).
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protect, for example, tenants as a class or subgroups thereof, the police
power limitation threatened to engulf the contract clause-a classic case of
an exception expanding to eliminate the rule. If the contract clause were
aimed at naked preferences, and if the police power were broadened to include as public values a wide range of regulatory measures, the prohibition
of naked preference would come in its weakest form. As we have seen, such
a weak version is almost no prohibition at all.
The Blaisdell Court did not go that far. It was still necessary to show
that there was some connection between the asserted police power goal and
the challenged exercise of authority. The function of this means-ends scrutiny, here as elsewhere, is to ensure that the government has not abrogated
a contract merely to distribute resources or opportunities to one set of persons rather than another. The requirement of showing a public value and a
connection between that value and the measure at issue is designed to filter
out such discriminatory government action.
It is in this general sense that modem contract clause doctrine remains
faithful to the original intent underlying the clause. Abrogations of private
contracts must not result from a naked preference for one person or group
over another, but must arise from an effort to promote a public value. The
"requirement of a legitimate public purpose guarantees that the State is
exercising its police power, rather than providing a benefit to special interests."1 55 This basic understanding is reflected in two recent developments
in contract clause doctrine. The first is a mild resuscitation of the constitutional prohibition; the second is a revitalization of that prohibition when a
state abrogates contracts to which it is a party.
The mild resuscitation of the contract clause occurred in Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,156 which involved a Minnesota statute that imposed a "pension funding charge" if a private employer terminated a
pension plan or closed a Minnesota office. 157 The Court invalidated the
statute on the ground that it was a "substantial impairment of a contractual relationship"' 58 justifying "a careful examination of the nature and
purpose of the state legislation."'15 9 The statute had "an extremely narrow
focus,"1 t ° applying to only a few private employers. It did not, in short,
155. Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412
(1983) (footnote omitted).
156. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
157. See id. at 236-38. The charge was imposed if the employer's pension funds did not
cover full pensions for all employees who had worked at least ten years. Employers were
required to satisfy the deficiency by purchasing deferred annuities payable to employees at
their retirement age. The company's own plan allowed for amendment or termination of the
pension plan at any time. Because the Minnesota statute required the plaintiff to fulfill pension obligations far beyond those to which it had voluntarily agreed, the effect of the statute
on the plaintiff was quite severe.
158. Id. at 244 (footnote omitted).
159. Id. at 245.
160. Id. at 248.
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"protect a broad societal interest rather than a narrow class.' 16' On these
grounds, the Court concluded that the Minnesota provision was unlike the
statute upheld in Blaisdell.
In Spannaus, the Court believed that the narrow application of the statute suggested a peculiar likelihood that it had resulted from interest group
pressures operating at the expense of a single company-in short, that a
naked preference was involved. A possible response, with which the Court
did not attempt to deal, would be that the state's protection of unjustly
disappointed expectations-by requiring vesting of the pension rightsshould now be treated as a classic exercise of the police power. But apparently in the Court's view, something else was behind the legislation in
Spannaus.
Some of these points were elaborated in two recent cases that permitted states to abrogate contractual provisions allowing companies to pass on
certain price increases to consumers.1 62 According to the Court, the effort
to relieve consumers from the dislocations caused by increased prices was a
legitimate public purpose sufficient to justify the abrogation.' 63 Like the
rationality cases under the due process and equal protection clauses, these
two cases reveal that when the permissible ends of government are expanded to include a wide range of redistributive measures, the constraint on
government action is sharply curtailed. Indeed, in both cases protection of
the class of statutory beneficiaries was itself taken as a public value-a notion that, as we saw in discussing the weak version of the prohibition,
threatens the distinction between naked preferences and public values, at
least for practical purposes.
It is not accurate, however, to say that under these recent cases the
constraint imposed by the contract clause disappears altogether. First, decisions based on raw political power are still prohibited-even though the
implementing devices designed to filter out such decisions are extremely
deferential. Protection of consumers was considered a public value not because a factional takeover is permissible, but because the Court agreed that
in the circumstances there was nothing illegitimate about an effort to pro161. Id. at 249 (footnote omitted).
162. Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 103 S. Ct. 2296 (1983); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v.
Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983). In Energy Reserves, the Court upheld a statute
prohibiting a state from enforcing a contractual provision allowing escalation of prices if the
federal government fixed a price for natural gas higher than the price specified in the contract. According to the Court, the police power includes the authority "to protect consumers
from the escalation of natural gas prices caused by deregulation." 459 U.S. at 417. Exxon
involved a state statute prohibiting producers ofoil and gas from passing on to consumers the
costs of an increase in the state's severance tax. The Court held that the contract clause did
not bar "a generally applicable rule of conduct designed to advance 'a broad social interest'."
103 S. Ct. at 2306 (footnote omitted). This holding is reminiscent of the requirement of
discriminatory intent under the equal protection clause: when an enactment is not directed
by its terms at an existing contract, but abrogates it as part of a more general function, there
is less basis for suspicion that a naked preference is at work.
163. See supra note 162.
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tect consumers from the dislocations caused by deregulation. Moreover, the
prohibition of naked preferences is still implemented by an examination of
the connection between means and legitimate ends.
Under the contract clause, heightened scrutiny is applied to the narrow
range of cases that fall within the rule of United States Trust Co. v. New
jersey,164 which held that more stringent review is appropriate when a state
abrogates a contract to which it is a party. 165 The underlying notion is that
when a state's self-interest is at stake, its motives are less likely to be trustworthy and there is a correspondingly greater likelihood that no public
value is being served. 166 Although the scrutiny may be somewhat more
deferential, this is the contract clause analogue to the heightened scrutiny
applied in the dormant commerce clause cases involving discriminatory effects and in the equal protection clause cases involving suspect classes. In
the contract clause context, as elsewhere, heightened scrutiny takes the form
of demanding a close fit between statutory means and ends and a showing
that less restrictive alternatives are unavailable.
The contract clause cases are thus another example of an area in which
the weak version of the prohibition of naked preferences provides little barrier to government action in most cases. There is no normative theory to
constrain the category of public values; developments like those associated
with both the Lochner era and heightened scrutiny under the equal protection clause have not occurred under the contract clause. Judicial scrutiny,
moreover, is highly deferential-in general, identical to what we have seen
when the weak version is applied under the equal protection and due process clauses, and open to similar criticisms. Scrutiny is heightened only
when there is a particular basis for suspicion about the reasons for government action.
F. Eminent Domain Clause
The eminent domain clause prohibits the taking of "private property
. ..for public use, without just compensation."' 67 In what must be the
judicial understatement of the last decade, the Supreme Court has con164. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
165. In United States Trust, the state had abrogated a contract prohibiting it from using
bondholders' investments in the Port Authority to pay for mass transportation. The Court
concluded that the legitimate police power goal-promoting energy conservation through
mass transportation-could be accomplished through means that did not abrogate the contract, including alternative strategies for promoting the use of mass transportation.
166. This notion is questionable. As an historical matter, it is doubtful that the contract
clause was intended to apply at all to contracts to which a state is a party. Moreover, a state's
interests are not as unilateral as the Court suggests; the mechanisms of political representation
serve as a check on abrogation. Finally, the state is not usually understood as a person with
interests independent of its citizens. Cf. id. at 33-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (challenging
heightened scrutiny applied by Court). On the other hand, the likelihood of overreaching
may be greater in the United States Trust context. See Note, A Process-Oriented Approach to
the Contract Clause, 89 Yale L.J. 1623 (1980).
167. U.S. Const. amend. V.
HeinOnline -- 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1723 1984

1724

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1689

fessed its inability "to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be
compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately
concentrated on a few persons."t 6 8 It will be sufficient here to show some of
the reasons for the current morass, reasons that require revisiting many of
the themes appearing under the due process and contract clauses. In particular, two aspects of eminent domain doctrine are centrally concerned with
the prohibition of naked preferences: eminent domain doctrine requires
that a taking be for a "public use," and it draws a distinction between an
impermissible taking and a legitimate exercise of the police power.
A principal theme of the eminent domain clause cases is that government action cannot be used to serve purely private ends. Taking property
from A in order to benefit B is the core example. The text of the clause
attests to this theme in the basic requirement that a "public use" be shown
before a taking is permitted, even with compensation. The function of this
requirement is to prevent purely private wealth transfers-that is, naked
preferences.
For a long period, the public use requirement was understood to mean
that if property was to be taken, it was necessary that it be used by the
public. That the new use was in some sense beneficial to the public was
insufficient.1 69 Eventually, however, it became clear that this test was unduly mechanical, for a wide range of uses by government served the public
at large, even if the public did not actually have access to the property. The
Mill Acts, which permitted riparian owners to erect and maintain mills on
neighboring property, provided an example. 170 After the courts upheld
those acts, exceptions were built into the general rule until the general rule
171
itself was abandoned.
This change in the public use requirement is the eminent domain analogue of the expansion in permissible government ends that followed the
Lochnerera. At about the same time, courts began to recognize that a range
of state regulatory activities going well beyond actual use by the public or
even the common law understanding of the police power were for "public
use"--justifiable by reference to some public value-and not naked prefer168. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Many commentators have explored the underpinnings of current doctrine. See, e.g., B. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution (1977); R. Epstein, supra note 148; Dunham, Griggs v.
Alleghany County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962
Sup. Ct. Rev. 63; Epstein, Not Deference, But Doctrine: The Eminent Domain Clause, 1982
Sup. Ct. Rev. 351; Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings and
the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36 (1964).
169. See generally Dunham, supra note 168, at 65-71 (recounting demise of public use
doctrine); Note, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58
Yale L.J. 599, 614 (1949) (arguing for "permanant interment" of public use doctrine).
170. See Note, supra note 169, at 604-05.
171. Id.
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ences at all. After Berman v. Parker172 and UnitedStates ex rel TVA v. Welch, 173
the public use requirement is met by standards that conform to the weak
version of the prohibition of naked preferences. Indeed, the test is even
more deferential than the rationality requirements of the due process and
equal protection clauses, for74the legislative judgment on the point is accepted as nearly conclusive.'
Analogous considerations apply to the distinction, critical to current
eminent domain doctrine, between permissible exercises of the police power
and impermissible takings. For many years, of course, that distinction has
been the key to separating "takings" from "regulation." The point is illustrated by Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.175 The statute at issue there forbade the mining of coal if the mining would cause subsidence of any place
used for human habitation. In its discussion of the police power, the Court
indicated that the statute would be plainly unconstitutional if it amounted
to a wealth transfer from the coal company to the homeowner for the homeowner's private benefit.1 76 In Miller v. Schoene, 77 the Court upheld a statute
requiring the destruction of cedar trees that were host to a communicable
plant disease on the ground that destruction was necessary to protect
against the infection of surrounding apple orchards, which were vital to the
state economy.' 78 If that statute could be shown to have conferred a general benefit-if, in short, the police power requirements were met-the statute would not be understood as reflecting a naked preference.
Miller in one sense reflects a familiar point. At least in the absence of a
physical taking, if a statute falls within the police power there is generally
no violation of the takings clause, even if no compensation is paid.' 79 In
another sense, however, the decision went far beyond this conventional understanding. In Miller, those whose cedar trees had been destroyed may not
have been committing a public nuisance at common law. But the Court
responded that if the government had failed to act,
[i]t would have been none the less a choice. . . . When forced to
such a choice the state does not exceed its constitutional powers by
172. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
173. 327 U.S. 546 (1946).
174. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984). In Midkif, the Court
unanimously upheld a Hawaii land reform statute that transferred title in real property from
lessors to lessees in order to reduce the concentration of land ownership. Relying on Berman
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), and other cases, Justice O'Connor's opinion expressed an extremely deferential public use standard. See 104 S. Ct. 2328-31.
The Court's understanding of the police power as a prohibition of naked preferences
renders the public use requirement superfluous. There is, however, considerable awkwardness
in assimilating, as the Court has, the public use and police power principles of the eminent
domain clause. For discussion, see Epstein, supra note 144.
175. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
176. Id. at 415-16.
177. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
178. Id. at 279-80.
179. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-85 (1980); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-28 (1978).
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deciding upon the destruction of one class of property in order to
save another. . . for it is obvious that there may be, and that here
there is, a preponderant public concern in the preservation of the
one interest over the other. 180
The Miller Court's statement reflects a point made earlier in connection with the due process clause: the new conception of the market status
quo as neither natural nor inviolate led the way after the Lochner era toward
a dramatically expanded understanding of the police power. This development led to a weak version of the prohibition of naked preferences. Indeed,
the seeds of a destruction of the eminent domain clause may lie within the
Miller Court's statement. If government inaction can be understood as government action-if a decision not to act is understood as an intrusion in the
same way as "affirmative" regulation-then the traditional notion of private property as natural and prepolitical loses much of its coherence.' 8 '
This perception accounts, at least in large part, for the existing doctrinal disarray. The requirement that a taking be for a public purpose has
been eroded by an understanding that almost all government action, even
that which transfers property from A to B, can be responsive to some public
purpose. This requirement is the eminent domain analogue to the rationality requirement of the due process clause; and for the same reasons that
apply there, both requirements are nearly always met. When "some public
program adjust[s] the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good,"'8 2 a taking will less readily be found.
The Court has not, of course, altogether abandoned the constraint imposed on government action by the eminent domain clause. Indeed, there
is a core of prohibited action that is more sharply defined than anything
under the contract or due process clauses. If the state physically invades a
person's property and transfers it to another, compensation is required even
if a public use can be shown.' 83 This requirement is best understood as a
rights constraint, for the government's motivation is irrelevant. In this respect, the eminent domain clause is not merely a prohibition of naked preferences. The Court has required compensation even in cases of
unobjectionable government motivation.
Perhaps this phenomenon can be attributed to a less ambiguous text.
Perhaps, too, it derives from the availability of the compensation requirement, a route by which government can achieve its purposes even if the
constitutional requirements for a "taking" have been met. Indeed, the requirement of compensation can be understood as rough insurance that a
180. 276 U.S. at 279.
181. Cf. Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1097
(1981) (discussing changing conceptions of property).
182. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
183. This physical-takings constraint does not, however, perfectly capture the core of
prohibited action under the eminent domain clause. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82-85 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 172-80 (1979);
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-28 (1978).
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public value is at stake. If government is willing to compensate the victim,
there is some reason to believe that a public value is in fact being served.
Public willingness to pay suggests that the measure in question is unlikely to
be a naked preference for one person at the expense of another. 184
III.

THE PROHIBITION OF NAKED PREFERENCES REVISITED

Part II of this Article has shown that a number of constitutional provisions, as currently interpreted, are aimed at a similar evil. The privileges
and immunities and dormant commerce clauses prohibit government from
treating in-staters better than out-of-staters, a prohibition based on a perception that a naked preference is especially likely to occur when political
representation is absent. The equal protection and due process clauses generalize this theme into an across-the-board prohibition of certain kinds of
government action. The contract and eminent domain clauses apply the
same prohibition to the particular areas of contracts and private property.
Because of the dramatic broadening in the category of permissible ends
that followed the Lochner era, the content of the contract and eminent domain clauses, as well as of the due process clause, has been sharply restricted. The shift has been from the strong to the weak version of the basic
prohibition as government has been permitted to implement, as public values, a wide range of redistributive measures. The prohibition is thus rarely
a basis for judicial invalidation under those clauses-perhaps because of
separation-of-powers concerns, perhaps because of a tacit belief that naked
preferences frequently occur in modern legislation and ought not to be too
readily subject to judicial invalidation. The results have changed dramatically over time, but the basic framework and the conception of the evil
prohibited by the various clauses has remained the same.
Current doctrine reflects significant overlaps in the implementing devices designed to filter out naked preferences. Under all six clauses, heightened scrutiny is applied when there is reason to suppose that a naked
preference is at work. In the equal protection context, heightened scrutiny
is triggered when there is facial discrimination against blacks or other
groups whose interests are believed inadequately served by the political process. Facial discrimination against out-of-staters is treated the same way
under the privileges and immunities and dormant commerce clauses.
Under the contract clause, abrogation by a state of contracts to which it is a
party receives similar treatment.
We are now in a position to examine the ways in which the basic prohibition of naked preferences varies under the several clauses. Under the due
process, contract, and eminent domain clauses, the Court has generally
adopted the prohibition in close to its weakest form. Raw political power is
184. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §§ 9-2, 9-4, at 458, 463-65 (1978). As
discussed earlier, however, modem contract clause doctrine has generally rested on a perception that compensation, while perhaps a sufficient condition for concluding that a public
value is at work, is hardly a necessary condition.
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not a legitimate basis for government action, but no other normative theory
limits the ends that the government may pursue. For practical purposes,
the line between public value and naked preference is quite thin, since attempts to protect particular groups are usually justifiable as responsive to
some public value. Heightened scrutiny is applied under the contract
clause only when a state abrogates a contract to which it is a party. A rights
constraint, invalidating even well-motivated government decisions, appears
only in a narrow category of cases under the due process clause and in cases
of physical invasion under the eminent domain clause.
The dormant commerce and privileges and immunities clauses reflect a
somewhat different structure. Here, too, no normative theory beyond the
weak version of the prohibition operates to limit the permissible ends of
government; and there is no rights constraint under these clauses. But
heightened scrutiny is applied more readily. Under both clauses, there is a
per se rule or strong presumption of invalidity in cases of facial discrimination against out-of-staters. Under the dormant commerce clause, the existence of discriminatory effects on out-of-staters triggers close examination of
the means-ends connection and investigation of whether there are less restrictive alternatives. These two clauses thus embody a version of the prohibition with no theory of impermissible ends beyond the prohibition of
naked preferences for in-staters, but with ready resort to heightened scrutiny to ensure that the state has not violated the prohibition.
The equal protection clause has the most complex structure of all. As
under the due process clause, rationality review reflects the weak version of
the prohibition. In addition, as under the due process clause, there is a
rights constraint on government action, though the category of rights is
somewhat different.18 5 Finally, facial discrimination against members of
racial minority groups triggers a strong presumption of invalidity.
But modem equal protection doctrine also reflects a normative theory
that prohibits discrimination against women, aliens, and illegitimates, even
in cases in which the weak version of the prohibition of naked preferences
has not been violated. In part, these results are responsive to the perceived
powerlessness of the various groups and to a resulting fear that a naked
preference is at work. The cases go further than this, however. Perhaps the
Court's normative theory can be attributed to changing social perceptions
of the role and status of such groups; perhaps it can be attributed to a perception that the relevant values in fact reflect existing relations of power;
perhaps it can be justified on independent grounds. But there is no doubt
that it assimilates several forms of discrimination to the prohibition of naked preferences, adopting a normative theory that identifies certain government ends as impermissible.
An important question raised by these developments involves the reasons for the shift from a strong to a weak version of the basic prohibition
and-under several clauses-the more recent shift to a different kind of
185. Compare supra note 122 (equal protection) with supra note 63 (due process).
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strong version. The due process, eminent domain, and contract clauses in
particular reflect an almost identical shift from a Lochner-like conception of
impermissible government ends to modern rationality review.
A central reason for the shift is the declining centrality of private property to modern constitutional adjudication. Under all three clauses, courts
have come to see the existing distribution of entitlements and wealth not as
inviolate, but as the result of conscious choice by government. The very
decision to allow the existing distribution to stand is a choice requiring justification. 186 As a result, efforts to alter that distribution in favor of an alternative one do not appear to be naked wealth transfers, but legitimate
efforts to promote the public good.
The abandonment of private property as a touchstone for judicial inquiry has left something of a vacuum in constitutional adjudication. Under
the contract, eminent domain, and due process clauses, private property
served an important ordering function. The Lochner era decisions under the
due process clause, and similar decisions under the contract and eminent
domain clauses, illustrate the point. There, a large category of legislative
ends, usually including the redistribution of wealth or entitlements, were
not treated as public values. In the modern era, the vacuum left by the
decline of private property has been filled only by a crudely conceived right
of "privacy" developed under the due process clause.
A strong version of the prohibition has reemerged in recent years, primarily under the equal protection clause. That strong version substitutes
for the touchstone of property a new conception based on an amalgam of
three principal features: a theory of impermissible motivations for treating
one group differently from another; a rough guess about the groups that are
likely to be mistreated in the pluralist process; and (occasionally) an effort
to inspect the legislative and administrative process in order to ensure that
the relevant values are genuinely public, in the sense that they are the product of broad deliberation rather than interest-group struggle.
All of these elements amount to an attack on the premises of interestgroup pluralism. The last one in particular embodies a perception that,
even if the political process is open and available to all, particular exercises
of government power should be inspected to ensure that a public value,
defined in both procedural and substantive terms, is at work. In this respect, the rise of equal protection scrutiny may be understood as compatible
not with the Lochner era itself, but with the subsequent understanding, reflected in West Coast Hotel v. Parish,187 that the existing social order should
not be regarded as natural but as the product of public choices and should
therefore be subjected to critical scrutiny. Such an understanding holds out
the promise (or threat) of a highly intrusive judicial posture. But whether
the various developments discussed in this Article will coalesce into a coher186. See Ackerman, On Getting What We Don't Deserve, 1 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 60 (1983);
supra text accompanying note 138.
187. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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ent substitute for the property-based rationale of previous constitutional
doctrines remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION

Many of the provisions of the Constitution are aimed at a single evil:
the distribution of resources to one person or group rather than another on
the sole ground that those benefited have exercised the raw political power
needed to obtain government assistance. This conception of the evil prohibited by the Constitution has manifested itself in the weak and strong
versions of the prohibition of naked preferences, which together account for
much of modem constitutional doctrine. Both versions of the prohibition
are in dramatic contrast with modern pluralist theory, which suggests that
the political process is precisely this sort of unprincipled warfare for scarce
social resources. 188 Under all of the clauses examined in Part II, such warfare is constitutionally impermissible. To be sure, the prohibition does not
always result in invalidation. But the cases are strikingly unanimous in
their vision of the prohibited end. In this respect, they reflect a sharp critique of interest-group pluralism, rather than an attempt to improve it
through ensuring the representation of all private interests.
To say that various constitutional provisions are targeted at the same
basic evil is not to deny that considerable work needs to be done in order to
understand and filter out the naked preferences that these provisions prohibit. The prohibition has been applied to both the state and federal governments; perhaps the institutional differences between the two justify
different forms of judicial scrutiny. There is evidence that state governments are peculiarly susceptible to capture by groups bent on distributing
wealth or opportunities in their own favor. 189 On the other hand, the consequence of any such capture is far more severe in the federal system, since
"exit" is not a realistic option in that context. And it may be that the civic
virtue associated with the republican tradition is most likely to be found
and promoted in relatively small communities. Theories involving federalism or other forms of decentralization may therefore play a significant role
in the evaluation and development of the prohibition of naked preferences.
Moreover, the basic prohibition may seem puzzling in light of the general perception' 90 that legislation is frequently the result of an unprincipled
struggle for power. It would be most useful to develop an understanding of
the functions, good and bad, served by the courts' simultaneous insistence
that naked preferences are prohibited and that they rarely occur. Such an
understanding might offer the basis for an evaluation of the powerful attacks that have been made on review of statutes for "rationality" under the
188. See supra note 25.
189. See R. Posner, The Crisis of the Federal Courts 237 (1985) (forthcoming) (copy on
file at the offices of the Columbia Law Review).
190. See supra note 24.
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due process and equal protection clauses. 19 '
A strong theory of limitations on government must also have a welldeveloped conception of impermissible ends. Such a theory would rule out
certain ends despite the fact that they do not violate the weak version of the
prohibition of naked preferences. Under both the due process and equal
protection clauses, and sometimes under the contract and eminent domain
clauses as well, the weak version of the prohibition has been supplemented
by theories of impermissible government ends. Judicial creation of such
theories is highly controversial, especially when they shift over time or can
be tied only with difficulty to the text and intended function of the relevant
clauses. Important tasks thus remain in developing both a coherent theory
of the judicial role and, under all of the clauses discussed here, a substantive
theory to buttress the weak version of the prohibition.
A vigorous theory must also develop devices, exemplified by modern
means-ends scrutiny, to filter out naked preferences, whether weakly or
strongly defined, and must establish when heightened scrutiny is appropriate under all of the relevant clauses. As we have seen, the prohibition of
naked preferences could, if vigorously enforced, serve as the basis for a distinctive conception of the government process and a distinctive judicial
role-both with considerable appeal. Such a conception would require the
creation of mechanisms to guarantee that the values to be served by legislation are genuinely public, in the sense that they are selected through
processes designed to ensure that government decisions are the product not
of preexisting private interests but of broad and open-ended public deliberation. 192 Such an approach, attempting to promote discussion and debate
rather than Hobbesian warfare, would be rooted in a perception that some
values may represent ideology-the result of private power-and thus may
not be truly "public" at all. 193 Generalizing from the decline of Lochner and
associated conceptions of private property, the effort would be to subject
existing social practices and relations to public scrutiny and review.194 In
its most ambitious form, an approach of this sort would require a highly
191. See supra notes 127-41 and accompanying text.
192. Cf. I J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action 286-88, 391-93 (1984)
(communicative action as basis of social determinations); C. Macpherson, Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval (1973) (proposing a form of liberalism without possessive individualism); Unger, supra note 128, at 602 (proposing "superliberalism"). The premise that
genuinely public values at least potentially exist is subject to doubt by those who believe that,
under current conditions, the result will not be dialogue but domination. See Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 765 (1982). And the project of discerning such values is
of course especially vexing in a large, industrialized polyarchy consisting of groups with competing interests. See J. Mansbridge, supra note 13, at 293-98.
193. See Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, Public Law, 54
Tulane L. Rev. 849, 866-76 (1980); Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong
with Rationality Review, 13 Creighton L. Rev. 487 (1979).
194. See R. Unger, Passion: An Essay on Personality 7-15 (1984) (describing "modernist view" that mental and social life depend on institutional and imaginative assumptions that
should be subject to critical scrutiny).
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intrusive judicial role, though it may be doubted to what extent courts
would be able to perform the relevant tasks.
However these issues are resolved, the constitutional prohibition of naked preferences serves to unite the dormant commerce, privileges and immunities, equal protection, due process, contract, and eminent domain
clauses. All of these clauses have been interpreted to require a particular
form of representation, one in which legislators do not respond solely to
interest-group pressures, but instead attempt to discern public values. Similar themes appear under other individual rights provisions of the Constitution as well. The principles governing regulation of speech,195 for example,
are based largely on faith in the relationship between public dialogue and
the processes of self-governance and an associated belief that free expression
is an indispensable means of ensuring the emergence of public values. Due
process rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard are intended to
ensure that government may not impose harms without justifying its action
by reference to a legitimate goal. 1 96 Indeed, we have seen that there is good
reason to believe that not only the individual rights provisions, but also the
97
structural provisions of the Constitution, are aimed at this core evil.'
To be sure, many constitutional provisions, including those discussed
here, are occasionally aimed at government action other than naked preferences. But the basic theme cuts across a surprisingly wide variety of clauses.
It is for this reason that the prohibition of naked preferences serves as the
most promising candidate for a unitary theory of the Constitution.
195. See supra note 2. The most obvious illustration is the difference in the nature of the

scrutiny applied to discriminatory and nondiscriminatory legislation. Legislation discriminating on the basis of the content of speech is subject to almost automatic invalidation. See,
e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). Content-neutral restrictions on speech are treated far more sympathetically. See, e.g., United
States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981). Similar distinctions appear under the religion clauses. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
196. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process, in Nomos
XVIII: Due Process (J. Pennock &J. Chapman eds. 1977); Stewart &Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1193 (1982).
197. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. A recent example is INS v. Chadha,
103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983) (invalidating legislative veto, in part on ground that evasion of bicameralism and presentment requirements increases risk of capture by faction).
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